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VIOLATIONS OF THE OBLIGATIONS OF
VICINAGE: REMEDIES UNDER ARTICLES 667
AND 669
A. N. Yiannopoulos*
INTRODUCTION
Articles 667-669 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 are the main
source of civil responsibility in the framework of vicinage. These arti-
cles impose certain duties on landowners and occupiers of immovable
property that are qualified in the Civil Code as "legal servitudes"'
and as "obligations" imposed by law independent of any agreement.2
The historical derivation, conceptual structure, and apparent mean-
ing of these articles; the nature, foundation, and extent of the respon-
sibility that they establish; and their applicability to acts, works, and
persons, have been dealt with extensively elsewhere.3 The following
study is devoted to an analysis of the remedies that are available to
an aggrieved party in case of violation of the obligations of vicinage
by a landowner or other occupier of immovable property. An effort is
made to determine the circumstances in which one may claim injunc-
tive relief, damages, or both. For the purpose of a better understand-
ing of the pertinent legal problems, and for the evaluation of possible
solutions, reference is made to common law and to the legal systems
of France, Germany, and Greece.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN ARTICLE 667 AND ARTICLE 669
Articles 666-669 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 form a unit,
and, for proper understanding, they must be read together. Article
667 prohibits works that cause damage or deprive neighbors of the
enjoyment of their properties; article 668 permits works that merely
cause some inconveniences; and article 669 indicates that, in the
absence of a conventional servitude, the question whether inconveni-
ences resulting from smoke or odors are to be tolerated depends on
police regulations and local customs. Apparently, the redactors of the
Civil Code intended to establish the following three principles: no one
may use his property so as to cause damage to another or interfere
substantially with the enjoyment of another's property (article 667);
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. CIv. CODE art. 664.
2. Id. arts. 659, 666, 674, 2292.
:1. S , Yiannopoulos, ('iti Responsiility in the Framework of Vicinage; Articles
667-669 and 2315 of the Civil Code, 49 T6L. L. REV. 195 (1974).
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landowners may be exposed to some inconveniences arising from the
normal exercise of the right of ownership by a neighbor (article 668);
and that, in the absence of a conventional servitude, no one is bound
to tolerate excessive emissions of smoke, odors, noise, dust, vapor,
and the like;4 the question of responsibility for such emissions is to
be determined in the light of local conditions (article 669).
Quite frequently, courts and scholars group articles 667-669 to-
gether, ' but incisive analysis indicates that distinction ought to be
made between article 667 and article 669. Such a distinction was
proposed for the first time in opinions rendered by Justice Barham.,
According to Justice Barham, article 667 establishes a veritable
predial servitude. Article 669, however, does not establish a predial
servitude, because "by providing redress for those in the same house
it would require a servitude on an estate in favor of the same estate."7
Moreover, "by providing redress for those in neighboring houses it
appears to give a cause of action for enforcing its provisions to persons
other than the proprietors of an estate."' Justice Barham concludes
thus "[s]uch results are contrary to our theory that predial servi-
tudes run with the land in favor of the proprietor of the estate."'
Reasoning and conclusion require comment. Under the Louisiana
Civil Code as well as under special legislation, an apartment in a
house may be a distinct immovable.'" Thus, article 669 does not nec-
4. The reference to smoke and odors in article 669 is merely illustrative of emis-
sions that may cause insufferable inconvenience. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 669 (comp.
ed. 16 West L.S.A.-Civ. Code 1972); Robichaux v. Huppenbauer, 258 La. 139, 155,
245 So. 2d 385, 391 (1971) (concurring opinion by Justice Barham).
5. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1946-1947 Term-
Property, 8 LA. L. REV. 234, 237 (1948); The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for
the 1949.1950 Term-Property, 11 LA. L. REV. 179 (1951); The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1954-1955 Term-Property, 16 LA. L. REV. 227, 229 (1956); The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1965-1966 Term-Property, 27 LA. L.
REV. 436, 438 (1967); cf. Hilliard v. Shuff, 260 La. 384, 256 So. 2d 127 (1971); Devoke
v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 211 La. 729, 30 So. 2d 816 (1947); Hamilton v. City of Shreve-
port, i80 So. 2d 30 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965); Bankston v. Farmers Coop. Gin, 116 So.
2d 91 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1959); Codding v. Braswell Supply, Inc., 54 So. 2d 852 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1951).
6. See Hilliard v. Shuff, 260 La. 384, 392, 256 So. 2d 127, 130 (1972) (dissenting
opinion); Robichaux v. Huppenbauer, 258 La. 139, 155, 245 So. 2d 385, 391 (1971)
(concurring opinion); Reymond v. State, Dept. of H'ways, 255 La. 425, 443 n.6, 231
So. 2d 375, 382 n.6 (1970).
7. Reymond v. State, Dept. of H'ways, 255 La. 425, 443 n.6, 231 So. 2d 375, 382
n.6 (1970).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. ,SV LA. CIv. ConE art. 506; LA. R.S. 9:1121-42 (Supp. 1962); Yiannopoulos,
Predial Servitudes: General Principles: Louisiana and Comparative Law, 29 LA. L.
REV. 1, 17 (1968).
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essarily presuppose a servitude on an estate in favor of another estate,
which, of course, is not legally possible.II Moreover, one may question
the statement that this article does not establish a servitude because
this would be contrary to our theory that predial servitudes run with
land in favor of the proprietor of an estate. According to contempo-
rary civilian analysis, the so-called legal servitudes must be regarded
as limitations on the content of the right of ownership rather than as
predial servitudes in the strict sense of the word.'2 Therefore, if article
667 establishes a limitation on ownership it would seem that so does
article 669, albeit by virtue of police regulations and local customs
rather than by direct legislation.
Nevertheless, a survey of Louisiana jurisprudence tends to con-
firm the existence and relevance of a distinction between article 667
and article 669 for the resolution of both doctrinal and practical prob-
lems.' 3 The two provisions have distinct areas of application and the
responsibility that they impose has distinct foundation.
Article 666 declares that "the law imposes upon proprietors
various obligations towards one another, independent of all agree-
ments; and those are the obligations which are prescribed in the
following articles." The following two articles clearly contemplate
obligations imposed on proprietors in favor of other proprietors in the
neighborhood. Article 669, however, employs much broader language,
and argument may be made that it refers to certain obligations that
local customs and police regulations impose on any occupier of land
in favor of his neighbors, be they landowners or not. Of course, this
argument drawn from the language of article 669 alone is considera-
bly weakened if the article is read in combination with article 666.
Be this as it may, a functional analysis of Louisiana jurisprudence
indicates that articles 667 and 668 apply directly to proprietors and
by analogy to other occupiers of land. Article 669, however, which is
the source of civil responsibility for insufferable inconveniences, cor-
responding with the common law of nuisance, applies directly to
actions brought by a variety of plaintiffs against a variety of defen-
dants. '"
11. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 649, 619.
12. See 2 AUBRY ET RAu, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 280-323 (7th ed. Esmein 1961); 2
MARTY ET REYNAUD, DROIT CIVIL 162-65 (1965); Yiannopoulos, Predial Servitudes; Gen-
eral Principles: Louisiana and Comparative Law, 29 LA. L. REV. 1, 44 (1968); Caron,
Les "servitudes Legales" sont eller des servitudes rbelles, 12 REV. JUR. THEMIS 123
(1962).
13. See Yiannopoulos, Civil Responsibility in the Framework of Vicinage; Articles
667-669 and 2315 of the Civil Code, 49 TUL. L. REV. 195, 225 (1974).
14. Id. at 235.
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There is agreement between doctrine and jurisprudence that ar-
ticles 667 and 669 impose responsibility without negligence,'5 but
divergent views have been expressed concerning the nature of this
responsibility.'" Perhaps, the preferable view is that the nature of
responsibility under article 667 and article 669 is the same. Both
articles impose a species of legal responsibility, the incidents and
effects of which are determined by analogous application of the rules
of delictual obligations." There is, however, a substantial difference
in the foundation of the responsibility under article 667 and under
article 669. Responsibility under article 667 is founded on the notion
of abuse of the right of ownership' whereas responsibility under arti-
cle 669 is founded on the notion of an exceptional use of property that
is unreasonable under the circumstances.'" Responsibility under this
article thus goes far beyond the idea of abuse of right.
ARTICLE 667: ACTIONS FOR DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIONS
Article 667 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 prescribes duties
in the framework of vicinage but it does not expressly determine the
consequences of the violation of these duties. The words used in this
article, "deprivation of liberty" and "damage," are joined disjunc-
tively, and this may be taken to indicate the availability of injunctive
relief as well as compensation. Perhaps the redactors of the Civil
Code, following the civilian tradition, had contemplated that the
violation of the duties established by article 667 would give rise to
actions for injunctive relief and that damages would be claimed
15. See, e.g., Craig v. Montelepre Real. Co., 252 La. 502, 211 So. 2d 627 (1968);
Fontenot v. Magnolia Petro. Co., 227 La. 866, 80 So. 2d 845 (1955); Devoke v. Yazoo
& M.V.R.R., 211 La. 729, 30 So. 2d 816 (1947).
16. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1946-1947 Term-
Torts, 8 LA. L. REV. 248 (1948); The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1956-
19.57 Term-Torts, 18 LA. L. REV. 63 (1957); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1965-1966 Term-Torts, 26 LA. L. REV. 510, 514 (1966); The Work of
the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970 Term-Torts, 31 LA. L. REv. 231
(1971); The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1946-1947 Term-Property,
8 LA. L. REV. 234, 236 (1948); The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1949-
19,50 Term-Property, 11 LA. L. REV. 178, 179 (1951); The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1954-1955 Term-Property, 16 LA. L. REV. 227, 228 (1956); The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1965-1966 Term-Property, 27 LA. L.
REV. 436, 438 (1967); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970
Term-Property, 31 LA. L. REV. 217 (1971); Stone, Tort Doctrine in Louisiana; The
Obligations of Neighborhood, 40 TUL. L. REV. 701 (1966).
17. See Yiannopoulos, Civil Responsibility in the Framework of Vicinage; Articles
667-669 and 2315 of the Civil Code, 49 TUL. L. REV. 195, 212 (1974).
18. Id. at 216.
19. See text at note 230 infra.
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under the law of delictual obiigations. 2° Be this as it may, there
should be no doubt that one may claim under this provision injunc-
tive relief, damages, or both.2
Damages
Article 667 imposes civil responsibility for acts, constructions,
and activities that may be "the cause of any damage" to neighboring
landowners. This, however, does not mean that all damage, however
caused, is compensable under this article. No legal system has ever
compensated neighbors for all damage suffered as a result of works
and activities on neighboring property. If all damage were compensa-
ble, the prerogatives of ownership would be drastically curtailed.
"[Elvidently an owner cannot be debarred from the legitimate use
of his property simply because it may cause real damage to his neigh-
bor. It would be contrary to the fundamental legal principle according
to which the exercise of a right cannot constitute fault or wrong
.. ."I' As a matter of fact, damage awards under article 667 are
always predicated on a finding that duties imposed by this article are
violated, on proof of actual damage,2 3 and on proof that the damage
20. See Stone, The Loesch Case and Article 667, 17 TUL. L. REV. 596, 599-600
(1943); cf. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 864-67, 2315. Indicatively, corresponding provisions in
the Greek Civil Code provide for injunctive relief only. See GREEK CIv. CODE arts. 1000,
1003-05. Damages may be claimed under the law of delictual obligations. Id. arts. 914,
919; BALlS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY 96 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek).
21. In Borenstein v. Joseph Fein Caterers, Inc., 255 So. 2d 800 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1971), suit was brought for injunction and damages under article 667. The trial court
had maintained defendant's exception of improper cumulation of actions and had
required plaintiffs to elect between the abatement suit and the damage suit. Upon
plaintiffs' election to proceed in abatement, the trial court dismissed the damage suit
without prejudice. On appeal, plaintiffs assigned as error the maintaining of the excep-
tion of improper cumulation of actions which resulted in the dismissal of their damage
suit. The court of appeal refused to pass on the merits of plaintiffs' argument, because
the judgment dismissing the suit for damages was a final judgment that had not been
appealed. An appeal from that judgment should have been successful. There is no
objection to having two demands on the basis of the same facts. See LA. CODE Civ. P.
arts. 461, 462; Blanc v. Murray, 36 La. Ann. 162 (1884). Most cases, however, in which
demands were made for damages and injunctive relief in the same action involved
responsibility under article 669. See McGee v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 206 La. 121, 19 So.
2d 21 (1944); Dodd v. Glen Rose Gas. Co., 194 La. 1, 193 So. 349 (1939); Di Carlo v.
Laundry & Dry Clean. Serv., 178 La. 676, 152 So. 327 (1933).
22. Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 145 La. 233, 236, 82 So. 206, 207
(1919); cf. Eclipse Towboat Co. v. Ponchartrain R.R., 24 La. Ann 1, 12 (1872); Donovan
v. City of New Orleans, 11 La. Ann. 711 (1856); Adams v. Grigsby, 152 So. 2d 619, 624
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
23. See Young v. International Paper Co., 179 La. 803, 155 So. 231 (1934); Rhodes
v. International Paper Co., 174 La. 50, 139 So. 755 (1932); Wolf v. Stewart, 48 La. Ann.
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has been caused by defendant's acts, constructions, or activities."
What constitutes a violation of the duties imposed by article 667 is
not always easy to determine. Perhaps, the best formula is that there
is a violation of the duties imposed by this article when a landowner
abuses his right of ownership.2 5
It would seem that the terms of article 667 are sufficiently broad
to support awards for structural damage to immovable property for
depreciation of land values, and for all injuries to persons. Most
actions brought or decided under article 667, however, involve claims
for structural damage caused to immovable property. In conspicu-
ously few cases, when structural damage to property was shown,
courts have allowed damages for injury to a person's health or enjoy-
ment of the property.2" The question whether apart from structural
damage, diminution of land values is recoverable under article 667
remains largely unresolved in Louisiana jurisprudence.27
Physical damage to immovable property is recoverable in Louis-
iana by a variety of actions, including those brought under Article 1,
Section 2, of the Constitution of 192126 and under articles 2315, 667,
and 669 of the Civil Code. These provisions overlap in part but estab-
lish distinct grounds of responsibility. It is conceivable that responsi-
bility may rest on one of them exclusively or on several cumulatively
for a single recovery. It would be futile to attempt to draw lines of
demarcation among articles 667, 669, and 2315 from the viewpoint of
recoverable damage. It would seem that all kinds of damage may be
recoverable under any of these provisions. The only pertinent differ-
entiation relates to the nature, scope, and foundation of the responsi-
bility that these provisions impose. Article 2315 allows recovery of
1431, 20 So. 908 (1896); Betz v. Coteau, 261 So. 2d 373 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972). For
the measure of damages, see Roshong v. Travelers Ins. Co., 281 So. 2d 785 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1973); D'Albora v. Tulane Univ., 274 So. 2d 825 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
24. See Lombard v. Sewerage & Water Bd., 284 So. 2d 905 (La. 1973); Modica v.
Employers Cas. Co., 231 La. 1065, 93 So. 2d 659 (1957); Hanemann v. Deep South Dis.
Co., 185 So. 2d 81 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966); Watson v. Mid-Continent Aerial Sprayers,
170 So. 2d 149 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964); Elysian Cocktail Lounge & Rest. v. Scianibra
& Masino, Inc., 124 So. 2d 149 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1960); Beck v. Bob Bros. Const. Co.,
72 So. 2d 765 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1954).
25. For detailed discussion, see Yiannopoulos, Civil Responsibility in the Frame-
irork of Vi(im,,o,: Article.s 667-669 and 2315 of the Civil Code, 49 Tui.. L. REV. 195, 218
(1974); see also D'Albora v. Tulane Univ., 274 So. 2d 825, 832 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
26. See, e.g., Roshong v. Travelers Ins. Co., 281 So. 2d 785 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973);
Sharon %-. Conoecticut Fire Ins. Co., 270 So. 2d 900 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972); cf.
Gotreaux v. Gary, 232 La. 373, 94 So. 2d 293 (1957).
27. See text at notes 272-78 infra.
28. See, e.g., Reymond v. State, Dept. of H'ways, 255 La. 425, 231 So. 2d 375
(1970); Kendall v. State, 168 So. 2d 840 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
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damage to property and persons caused by one's fault, including
abuse of right and ultrahazardous activities; article 667 allows recov-
ery of damage to property and persons caused by one's abuse of the
right of ownership; and article 669 allows recovery of damage to
property and persons in circumstances in which the gravity of the
harm suffered by those near-by outweighs the social utility of one's
acts, constructions, and activities on land.29
Until about the middle of this century, it was apparently thought
that physical damage to immovable property was recoverable only
upon a showing of negligence or intentional misconduct. Thus, re-
sponsibility for damage caused by dynamite blasting, 0 pile driving,'
by escaping substances such as salt water32 or chemical wastes,3" and
even by the emission of smoke, fumes, dust, and the like, 4 was deter-
mined by application of the traditional notion of fault in article 2315.
Today, however, Louisiana jurisprudence is settled that physical
damage to property may also be recovered without regard to defen-
dant's negligence by application of articles 667 and 669.
Article 667 has been consistently applied by Louisiana courts in
recent years to support awards for physical damage to immovable
property caused by dynamite blasting,15 pile driving,"6 aerial spraying
29. For detailed discussion, see Yiannopoulos, Civil Responsibility in the Frame-
work (,f Viciagwc: Articles 667-669 and 2315 of the Civil Code, 49 TUo. L. REV. 195, 220
(1974I: srr also text at note 243 infra.
30. See Watkins v. Gulf Ref. Co., 206 La. 942, 20 So. 2d 273 (1944); Angelloz v.
Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 196 La. 604, 199 So. 656 (1940); Gerald v. Standard Oil Co.,
204 La. 690, 16 So. 2d 233 (1943); Mcllhenny v. Roxana Petro. Corp., 122 So. 165 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1929).
31. See Egan v. Hotel Grunewald Co., 129 La. 163, 55 So. 750 (1911); Loesch v.
R.P. Farnsworth & Co., 12 So. 2d 222 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1943); cf. Myevre v. Bob Bros.
Const. Co., 192 So. 2d 859 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966). As late as 1960, certain courts
expressed doubts whether a contractor's responsibility for pile driving operations rests
on negligence under article 2315 or on article 667 without regard to negligence. See
Elysian Cocktail Lounge & Rest. v. Sciambra & Masino, Inc., 124 So. 2d 149 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1960); cf. Modica v. Employers Cas. Co., 231 La. 1065, 93 So. 2d 659 (1957).
32. See Parro v. Fifteenth Oil Co., 25 So. 2d 30 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1946).
33. See Rhodes v. International Paper Co., 174 La. 50, 139 So. 755 (1932); Spyker
v. International Paper Co., 173 La. 580, 138 So. 109 (1931); Orton v. Virginia Carol.
Chem. Co., 142 La. 790, 77 So. 632 (1918); Long v. Louisiana Creos. Co., 137 La. 862,
69 So. 281 (1915).
34. See Wichers v. New Orleans Acid & Fert. Co., 128 La. 1011, 55 So. 657 (1911).
35. See Fontenot v. Magnolia Petro. Co., 227 La. 866, 80 So. 2d 845 (1955); Rosh-
ong v. Travelers Ins. Co., 281 So. 2d 785 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973); Gullat v. Ashland
Oil & Ref. Co., 243 So. 2d 820 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971); Wright v. Superior Oil Co., 138
So. 2d 688 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
36. See Lombard v. Sewage & Water Bd., 284 So. 2d 905 (La. 1973); Chaney v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 259 La. 1, 249 So. 2d 181 (1971); Craig v. Montelepre Real. Co.,
252 La. 502, 211 So. 2d 627 (1968); Jeanfreau v. Sanderson, 239 La. 51, 117 So. 2d 907
19741
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of noxious chemicals,37 and by escaping dangerous substances such as
dammed water.3 " Such cases, involving responsibility for ultrahazar-
dous activities, may be best considered as matters of delictual re-
sponsibility within the expanded meaning of fault under article
2315.11 Article 667 has also been applied to support awards for physi-
cal damage to property caused by constructions, such as falling
walls4 or storage tanks.4 Finally, in a number of cases, article 667 has
been applied to support awards for physical damage to property
caused by excessive emissions of smoke, fumes, dust, soot, and the
like, whether alone,4" or in combination with article 669. 41
Injunctions
Article 667 seems to contemplate the availability of injunctive
relief when acts, constructions, or activities on neighboring property
deprive an owner "of the liberty of enjoying his own" property or
(1960); D'Albora v. Tulane Univ., 274 So. 2d 825 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973); Legendre
v. Boh Bros. Const. Co., 268 So. 2d 514 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972); Menard v. Andrew
Jackson Apt's. Inc., 255 So. 2d 249 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969); Selle v. Kleamenakis, 142
So. 2d 50 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
37. See Gotreaux v. Gary, 232 La. 373, 94 So. 2d 293 (1957); Watson v. Mid-
Continent Aerial Sprayers, 170 So. 2d 149 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964); Trahan v. Bearb,
138 So. 2d 420 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962); Jones v. Morgan, 96 So. 2d 109 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1957).
38. See Sharon v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 270 So. 2d 900 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1973); Hamilton v. City of Shreveport, 180 So. 2d 30 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
39. See Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971).
40. See Tunnage v. Eddy, 42 So. 2d 382 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1949); Mayer v. Ford,
12 So. 2d 618 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1943); cf. Betz v. Coteau, 261 So. 2d 373 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1972).
41. See Gretna Mach. & Iron Wks., Inc. v. Southwestern Sugar & Mol. Co., 166
So. 2d 54 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
42. See Daigle v. Continental Oil Co., 277 F. Supp. 875 (W.D. La. 1967) (various
emissions); Burke v. Besthoff Real. Co., 196 So. 2d 293 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967)
(vibrations); Codding v. Braswell Supply, Inc., 54 So. 2d 852 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1951)
(dust, acid gas); cf. Eastern Air., Inc. v. American Cy. Co., 321 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1963);
O'Neal v. Southern Car. Co., 216 La. 96, 43 So. 2d 230 (1949); Union Fed. Say. & L.
v. 451 Florida Corp., 256 So. 2d 356 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971). Damage caused by
vibrations resulting from the use of machinery may also be recoverable under Article
669. See Di Carlo v. Laundry & Dry Clean. Serv., 178 La. 676, 152 So. 327 (1933); cf.
Irby v. Panama Ice Co., Inc., 184 La. 1082, 168 So. 306 (1936); Meyer v. Kemper Ice
Co., Inc., 180 La. 1037, 158 So. 378 (1934).
43. Cf. McGee v. Yazzo & M.V.R.R., 206 La. 121, 19 So. 2d 21 (1944); Froelicher
v. Southern Mar. Wks., 118 La. 1077, 43 So. 882 (1907); Froelicher v. Oswald Iron.,
Ltd., 111 La. 705, 35 So. 821 (1903); Kelly v. Ozone Tung Coop, 36 So. 2d 837 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1948); Galouye v. A.R. Blossman, Inc., 32 So. 2d 90 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1947).
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''may be the cause of any damage to him." For the same reasons,
however, that not all damage is compensable," not all acts, construc-
tions, or activities that deprive an owner of the enjoyment of his
property or cause damage to him may be enjoined under this article.
As a matter of fact, injunctive relief under article 667 is always predi-
cated upon violation of the duties imposed by this article" and upon
proof of actual or impending46 deprivation of enjoyment" or damage.,
A survey of Louisiana jurisprudence discloses a paucity of cases
in which injunction was sought or obtained on the basis of article 667
alone. Ordinarily, injunctive relief is predicated on violation of duties
imposed by article 669 of the Civil Code,4" on the provisions of the
same code dealing with new works,50 and on the pertinent provisions
of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. 51 At this point, it is appro-
priate to notice a distinction as to the basis of injunctive relief under
article 667 and under article 669. Injunctive relief under article 669
is ordinarily based on a finding that an exceptional use of property
that is unreasonable under the circumstances causes damage or ex-
cessive inconvenience to persons of normal sensibilities. Injunctive
relief under article 667, however, is available even in the absence of
a showing of physical discomfort" whenever acts, constructions, or
activities on neighboring property constitute an abuse of the right of
44. See text at notes 22-24 supra.
45. See Hilliard v. Shuff, 260 La. 384, 256 So. 2d 127 (1972). Of course, an act,
construction, or activity may violate the duties imposed by this article as well as duties
imposed by other provisions. Id.
46. See Salter v. B.W.S. Corp., 281 So. 2d 764 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973); cf. Fuselier
v. Spalding, 2 La. Ann. 773 (1847) (injunction prohibiting the burning of a brick kiln
on neighboring property).
47. See Hilliard v. Shuff, 260 La. 384, 256 So. 2d 127 (1972); Morris v. Putsman,
166 La. 14, 116 So. 577 (1928). For example, under certain circumstances, the fear of
spreading contagious disease from a near-by hospital might be the basis of an injunc-
tion under article 667. Cf. Milne v. Davidson, 5 Mart. (N.S.) 409 (La. 1827).
48. See Borenstein v. Joseph Fein Caterers, Inc., 255 So. 2d 800 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1972); Salter v. B.W.S. Corp., 281 So. 2d 764 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973). Both damage
awards and injunctive relief are predicated on violation of the duties imposed by article
667. Thus, an abusive exercise of the right of ownership ought to be enjoined without
balancing equities. Such a process is appropriate in case of violation of duties imposed
ay article 669. Cf. Busby v. International Paper Co., 95 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. La. 1951);
Young v. International Paper Co., 179 La. 803, 155 So. 231 (1934).
49. See text at notes 289, 304 infra.
50. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 856-69.
51. See LA. CODE CIv. P. arts. 3601, 3663.
52. See Hilliard v. Shuff, 260 La. 384, 256 So. 2d 127 (1972); Salter v. B.W.S.
Corp., 281 So. 2d 764 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973); Borenstein v. Joseph Fein Caterers, Inc.,
255 So. 2d 800 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
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ownership. '3 Whether acts, constructions, or activities constitute such
an abuse of the right of ownership as to justify injunctive relief is
not to be decided by the application of any broad or inflexible
rule, but by a careful weighing of all the circumstances attending
them, by diagnosing them . . . with the aid and guidhnce of the
two principles, that the owner must not injure seriously any right
of his neighbor, and, even in the absence of any right on the part
of the neighbor, must not in an unneighborly spirit do that which
while of no benefit to himself causes damage to the neighbor.
51
Thus, depending on the circumstances, the raising of a fence, '5
the dumping of chemical wastes on one's own property,-' the burning
of a brick kiln,57 the maintenance of a raised planter and vine,5 and
the storage of combustible materials, 5 may constitute an abuse of the
right of ownership that supports injunctive relief under article 667.
But when a landowner does not abuse his right of ownership injunc-
tive relief is not available, even though neighbors are deprived of
enjoyment or suffer damage. 6 Thus, when a landowner without abus-
ing his right of ownership locates electric wires" or railroad tracks2
near the boundary line of his property, digs a canal on his property,13
or drains a common underground water reservoir 4 injunctive relief is
53. See text at note 25 supra.
54. Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 145 La. 233, 246, 82 So. 206, 211
(1919); cf. Blanc v. Murray, 36 La. Ann. 162 (1884).
55. See Parker v. Harvey, 164 So. 507 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935). But see Williams
v. Beverly, 160 So. 2d 291 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964); Wolf v. Stewart, 48 La. Ann. 1431,
20 So. 908 (1896) (raising of fence not an abusive exercise of the right of ownership).
56, See Salter v. B.W.S. Corp., 281 So. 2d 764 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973); but cf.
Busby v. International Paper Co., 95 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. La. 1951); Young v. Interna-
tional Paper Co., 179 La. 803, 155 So. 231 (1934).
57. See Fuselier v. Spalding, 2 La. Ann. 773 (1847).
58, Sce Borenstein v. -oseph Fein Caterers, Inc., 255 So. 2d 800 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1972); cf. Gilly v. Hirsch, 122 La. 966, 48 So. 422 (1909) (sign).
59. See Hilliard v. Shuff, 260 La. 384, 256 So. 2d 127 (1972); Blanc v. Murray, 36
La. Ann. 162 (1884). But see Galouye v. A.R. Blossman, Inc., 32 So. 2d 90 (La. App.
Ist, Cir. 1947) (storage of gasoline; no abusive exercise of ownership and therefore no
injunction).
60. See Werges v. St. Louis, Chicago & N.O.R.R., 35 La. Ann. 641 (1883).
61. See Morris v. Putsman, 166 La. 14, 116 So. 577 (1928).
62. Id.; Werges v. St. Louis, Chicago, & N.O.R.R., 35 La. Ann. 641 (1883).
63. See Jeansonne v. Cox, 233 La. 251, 96 So. 2d 557, 559 (1957).
64. See Adams v. Grigsby, 152 So. 2d 619, 624 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963). Of course,
a neighbor "might be entitled to relief under certain circumstances; for example, if
defendant by his actions caused the pollution of plaintiffs water supply, rendering it
unfit for their use, or if he simply opened his own well and allowed it to pour out the
water as waste without benefit to himself." Cf. McCoy v. Arkansas Nat. Gas Co., 184
La. 101, 165 So. 632 (1936).
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not available.
Injunctive relief under article 667 is a matter of right. Cases may
be found in which Louisiana courts declared that acts, constructions,
and activities may be enjoined only if they cause "material, substan-
tial, and irreparable injury to property owners, for which there is no
adequate remedy at law,""5 and that "where substantial redress can
be afforded by the payment of money and issuance of an injunction
would subject the defendant to grossly disproportionate hardship,
equitable relief may be denied."" These cases, influenced by common
law notions that are not applicable in Louisiana, confuse the require-
ments for injunctive relief under article 3601 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, or for that matter under article 669 of the Civil Code, with
the requirements for injunctive relief under article 667 of the Civil
Code. Under article 3601 of the Code of Civil Procedure, injunctive
relief is predicated on a showing of "irreparable injury, loss, or dam-
age,"' "7 and under article 669 of the Civil Code injunctive relief is
predicated on a showing of damage or excessive inconvenience result-
ing from an exceptional use of property that is unreasonable under
the circumstances."5 Under these provisions, equitable considera-
tions, such as balancing of interests and disproportionate hardship,
may be relevant. The duties that article 667 imposes, however, are
likened to servitudes, and, as servitudes, are enforceable by injunc-
tion upon a showing of actual or impending damage or deprivation
of enjoyment, resulting from an abusive exercise of the right of owner-
ship by a neighbor. 9 Recent decisions correctly point out that injunc-
tive relief in this field of property law is available without the histori-
cal limitations of equity jurisprudence'" and that in an action for
injunction under article 667 it is not "necessary" to plead and prove
irreparable injury.7 The basis for injunctive relief under article 667
65. Robertson v. Shipp, 50 So. 2d 699, 703 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1951) (dicta; commer-
cial kennel). Cf. Hilliard v. Shuff, 260 La. 384, 256 So. 2d 127 (1972); Fuselier v.
Spalding, 2 La. Ann. 773 (1847); Beauvais v. D.C. Hall Transp., 49 So. 2d 44 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1950).
66. Young v. International Paper Co., 179 La. 803, 810, 155 So. 231, 233 (1934).
See also Givson v. City of Baton Rouge, 161 La. 637, 109 So. 339 (1926); Busby v.
International Paper Co., 95 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. La. 1951). But see Poole v. Guste, 261
La. 110, 262 So. 2d 339 (1972).
67. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 3601; cf. id. art. 3663.
68. See text at notes 230-43 infra.
69. See Poole v. Guste, 261 La. 110, 262 So. 2d 339 (1972).
70. Id.
71. Borenstein v. Joseph Fein Caterers, Inc., 255 So. 2d 800, 805 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1972). See also City of New Orleans v. Degelos Bros. Grain Corp., 175 So. 2d 351
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
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is thus the same as in actions for damages, and, upon the same proof,
the court is bound to grant the relief to which plaintiff is entitled. The
court does not enjoy discretion to grant damages in lieu of injunctive
relief. There may be instances, however, in which an aggrieved party
may be only entitled to damages because his acts, constructions, or
activities do not constitute an abuse of the right of ownership but
entail responsibility for damages under other provisions of law.
In Hilliard v. Shuf,7 2 a landowner sued the lessee of adjoining
property, owner and operator of a service station, to compel him to
remove or place underground certain fuel tanks. The tanks were lo-
cated above ground within five feet of plaintiff's property; they were
designed for the storage of crude oil, but were used by defendant for
the storage of much more volatile gasoline and diesel fuels. As a result
of such use, fumes that could be ignited by random sparks escaped
from the tanks and created a zone of danger extending well into
plaintiff's property. Plaintiff contended that the maintenance of the
tanks deprived him of the use of 45 feet of his property and posed a
threat to his residence in violation of articles 667 and 669.
A majority of the court was of the opinion that:
the storage of basic fuels, a lawful activity, does not, without
more, violate these articles . . . .When, however, the storage of
fuels creates a substantial hazard to the adjoining property, the
court must consider such factors as location, structure of the
storage tanks, quantity of fuel stored, operational procedures, as
well as surrounding circumstances. 3
In light of these considerations and pertinent evidence, the court
concluded that articles 667 and 669 had been violated by defendant's
use of crude oil tanks for the storage of gasoline and diesel fuel within
a few feet of plaintiff's property. Nevertheless, the majority of the
court was not prepared to grant the relief that plaintiff requested,
because the violation of the code articles relating to the use of prop-
erty "requires no automatic injunction to remove the tanks ....
Injunction is an equitable remedy and should be carefully designed
to achieve the essential correction at the least possible cost and incon-
venience to the defendant." 4 Since the record failed to reflect
whether some correction short of removal or underground placement
of the tanks was feasible, the case was remanded for the reception of
further evidence relative to the modes of correction.
72. 260 La. 384, 256 So. 2d 127 (1972).
73. Id. at 389, 256 So. 2d at 129.
74. Id. See also Haynes v. Smith, 85 So. 2d 326 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956).
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In an articulate dissenting opinion, Justice Barham advanced
the view that the violation of the duties imposed by article 667 gives
rise to an unqualified right for "an immediate and full abatement of
the encroachment" in the form of a permanent injunction: "the only
requirement is an objective finding of probability that the owner of
the dominant estate may at some time be deprived of enjoyment of
his property or suffer damage because of the work made on the ser-
vient estate. 7 5 In contrast, the violation of the duties imposed by
article 669 affords relief to any person who has been subjectively
inconvenienced in the enjoyment of property against any one, but
only to the extent that acts, constructions, or activities cause an
insufferable inconvenience."5 According to this view, which deserves
full attention for a possible revision of the Civil Code, there are differ-
ences between articles 667 and 669 as to both the basis and scope of
injunctive relief. The jurisprudence, however, appears to be settled
that there is a difference between the two articles as to the basis of
injunctive relief only; there is no difference as to the scope of injunc-
tive relief, which under either article, is available only to the extent
that it is required to correct a situation."
The case illustrates the tendency of courts to group together
articles 667-669. In reality, as Justice Barham observed, the case was
governed by article 667 exclusively. Article 668 had nothing to do with
plaintiffs demand because this article relieves an owner from respon-
sibility for inconveniences caused to neighbors when acts, construc-
tions, or activities are a normal exercise of the right of ownership.
Article 669 had no application because there was no complaint of
physical discomfort. 8 Since the action was governed by article 667
exclusively, the availability of injunctive relief was not subject to
limitations of equitable principles. But this does not mean that plain-
75. See Hilliard v. Shuff, 260 La. 384, 396, 256 So. 2d 127, 131 (1972) (dissenting
opinion).
76. Id.; Robichaux v. Huppenbauer, 258 La. 139, 245 So. 2d 385, 391 (1971) (con-
curring opinion). The requirements for injunctive relief under articles 667 and 669
differ because according to Justice Barham, the two provisions contemplate diitin-
guishable situations: article 667 establishes a veritable predial servitude whereas arti-
cle 669 establishes personal obligations. See notes 7-9 supra.
77. See text at notes 52-53 supra; Blanc v. Murray, 36 La. Ann. 162 (1884).
78. See text at notes 250-55 infra. Plaintiff might also have chosen to claim injunc-
tive relief under the articles of the Civil Code dealing with new works or under articles
3601 and 3663 of the Code of Civil Procedure. For good reasons, these were not the
vehicles chosen. An injunction under article 3601 would be limited to the suppression
of the cause of danger, that is, the improper use of the tanks. And an injunction under
article 3663 is available only in cases of disturbance of possession, in law or in fact.
There was no disturbance in law, and it is questionable whether there can be a disturb-
ance in fact without physical invasion of property.
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tiff had necessarily the right to an absolute injunction. When correc-
tion short of removal of constructions or absolute prohibition of activ-
ities is feasible, the court should limit the scope of injunctive relief.
If such a correction is not feasible, the court is, of course, bound to
issue an injunction ordering the removal of constructions or abso-
lutely prohibiting activities that constitute an abuse of the right of
ownership."
INTERMEZZO: ARTICLE 669 AND THE COMMON LAW OF NUISANCE
It has been said that article 669 has been applied by courts
"together with the common-law theory of nuisance"'" to grant relief
in cases in which use of property causes damage or excessive inconve-
nience to neighbors. This does not mean, of course, that there has
been wholesale adoption of the common law or that the common law
controls in this sensitive area of property relations.' Simply, Louis-
iana courts have developed, on the basis of article 669, a body of law
that corresponds to some extent with the law of nuisance in common
law jurisdictions, and, in so doing, they have at times been inspired
by solutions reached in sister states.
It was perhaps natural for Louisiana courts to seek in the past
guidance in common law precedents. French doctrine and jurisprud-
ence could furnish little guidance in this field, because the French
Civil Code does not contain an article corresponding with article 669
of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870.2 The common law of nuisance,
79. See Hilliard v. Shuff, 285 So. 2d 266 ( La. App. 3d Cir. 1973) (on remand);
Salter v. B.W.S. Corp., 281 So. 2d 764 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973); cf. Keay v. New Orleans
Canal & Bank. Co., 7 La. Ann. 259 (1852). Under article 669, however, in exceptional
circumstances, the court may permit constructions to stand or activities to continue,
particularly when inconveniences are unavoidable in spite of employment of contem-
porary technology. See text at note 311 infra.
80. Robichaux v. Huppenbauer, 258 La. 139, 149, 245 So. 2d 385, 389 (1971). In
this case, the writer of the majority opinion felt compelled to refer to the common law
of nuisance because he took an unduly restrictive view of the meaning of article 669.
See text at notes 150-52 infra.
81. Article 669 has been consistently applied by Louisiana courts since early
times, along with declarations that the common law of nuisance has no application in
Louisiana. See, e.g., Le Blanc v. Orleans Ice Mfg. Co., 121 La. 249, 46 So. 226 (1908);
Bell v. Riggs & Bro., 38 La. Ann. 555 (1886); Lewis v. Behan, Thorn & Co., 28 La. Ann.
130 (1876); City of New Orleans v. Lambert, 14 La. Ann. 247 (1859); Milne v. David-
son, 5 Mart. (N.S.) 409 (La. 1827); cf. State ex rel. Violett v. King, 46 La. Ann. 78, 14
So. 12:1 (1 94): luselier v. Spalding, 2 La. Ann. 773 (1847). Devoke v. Yazoo &
M.V.R.R., 211 La. 729, 30 So. 2d 816 (1947) has been the starting point of a new
jurisprudence with a distinct civilian flavor.
82. See Froelicher v. Southern Mar. Wks., 118 La. 1077, 43 So. 882 (1907). See
also Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 145 La. 233, 82 So. 206 (1919). It ought
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on the other hand, was supposed to reflect applications of the sic
utere doctrine, the same doctrine that articles 667-669 embody. In
recent years, however, critical analysis has demonstrated that, in
spite of similarities of underlying doctrine, the structure and function
of the law of nuisance is substantially different from the structure and
function of legal servitudes. Indeed, the law of nuisance is a branch
of the common law of torts whereas the legal servitudes are institu-
tions of civil law property." Accordingly, the modern trend in Louis-
iana jurisprudence calls for direct application of the provisions of the
Civil Code and for use of common law precedents selectively as illus-
trations of acceptable practical solutions."4 The Louisiana supreme
court has repeatedly declared that in this field of property law, "while
the common-law authorities . . . may be persuasive, they are not
decisive of the issue in view of our codal articles and jurisprudence. "8
Continued reliance on the common law of nuisance in the framework
of civil law property institutions is unnecessary and confusing. Louis-
iana courts are in a position to develop the practical implications of
article 669 in the light of contemporary exigencies, relying on civilian
methodology and on the accumulated body of Louisiana jurisprud-
ence. For the purpose of a better understanding of this jurisprudence,
however, brief reference ought to be made to the fundamentals of
common law nuisance.
Nuisance
At common law, there is no generally accepted definition of the
word "nuisance." In the words of a most influential writer:
There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law
than that which surrounds the word 'nuisance.' It has meant all
things to all men, and has been applied indiscriminately to every-
to be noted, however, that modern French jurisprudence has developed rules corre-
sponding to those established by articles 667-669 of the Louisiana Civil Code. See 3
PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITE PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 450-67 (2d ed. Picard 1952);
2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 282 (7th ed. Esmein 1961).
83. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970
Term-Property, 31 LA. L. REV. 196, 223 (1971); W. PROSSER, TORTS § 89, at 571 (4th
ed. 1971).
84. See Hilliard v. Shuff, 260 La. 384, 256 So. 2d 127 (1972); Rayborn v. Smiley,
253 So. 2d 664 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971); Borenstein v. Joseph Fein Caterers, Inc., 255
So. 2d 800 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
85. Frederick v. Brown Fun. Homes Inc., 222 La. 57, 62 So. 2d 100, 111 (1953);
Barrow v. Gaillardanne, 122 La. 558, 47 So. 891, 896 (1909): "The common law authori-
ties relied on by the defendants have no application to the present case." See also
Milne v. Davidson, 5 Mart. (N.S.) 409 (1827).
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thing from an alarming advertisement to a cockroach baked in a
pie. There is general agreement that it is incapable of an exact
or comprehensive definition. Few terms have afforded so excel-
lent an illustration of the familiar tendency of the courts to seize
upon a catchword as a substitute for any analysis of a problem."
The word "nuisance" is frequently used by common law courts
in a factual sense to describe acts, constructions, or activities on land
that are harmful or annoying. In this sense, annoying conduct, a pile
of garbage, or an industrial plant is a nuisance. The word is also used
by common law courts to denote the annoyance or damage caused by
acts, constructions, or activities on land. Thus, the harm caused by
loud noises, odors, or smoke is a nuisance to persons in the vicinity.
The use of the word nuisance in these two senses does not connote
responsibility. Thus, courts frequently raise the question whether a
particular activity or condition is an "actionable" nuisance.81 Quite
frequently, however, the term nuisance is used to mean both fact
situations and the responsibility that arises from them. Thus, judicial
decisions declare that a person is maintaining a nuisance, meaning
that a person is legally responsible for his acts, constructions, or
activities.
Until relatively recent times, writers in common law jurisdictions
failed to give full consideration to nuisance. It was only in 1939, on
the occasion of the publication of the Restatement of Torts, that a
significant attempt was made to determine the limits to types of tort
liability associated with the name of nuisance. The pertinent sections
of the Restatement of Torts, however, have dealt only with actions
at law for the protection of interests in the private use and enjoyment
of land, leaving the matter of injunctive relief to equity jurisprud-
ence." Moreover, use of the term nuisance has been carefully avoided
because it has been "attended with so much confusion and uncer-
tainty of meaning.""
Public and Private Nuisance
A nuisance, in the sense of a situation involving responsibility,
may be either public or private. A public nuisance is an offense
86. See W. PROSSER, TORTS § 86, at 571 (4th ed. 1971); cf. Yaffe v. City of Ft.
Smith, 178 Ark. 406, 10 S.W.2d 886 (1928); City of Phoenix v. Johnson, 51 Ariz. 115,
75 P.2d 30 (1938); District of Columbia v. Totten, 55 App. D.C. 312, 5 F.2d 374 (1925).
87. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS ch. 40, introductory note at 216 (1939); cf. McGee
v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 206 La. 121, 19 So. 2d 21 (1944).
88. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS ch. 40, introductory note at 215 (1939).
89. Id.
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against the state and may be abated on the motion of the appropriate
governmental authorities."0 Such a nuisance may arise from an inter-
ference with the use of public things, such as highways, navigable
rivers, and parks. It may also arise from conduct in violation of rules
of the common law or statutes expressing a public concern for the
health, safety, or property of a considerable number of persons. Thus,
a gambling establishment or a house of ill repute may be a public
nuisance.9'
A private nuisance is an offense against a private person, a tort,
and is actionable by this person.12 Quite frequently, conduct that
gives rise to a public nuisance may at the same time constitute a
private nuisance."3 The action for private nuisance has historically
protected interesis in the use and enjoyment of land, including inter-
ests in the use and enjoyment of easements and profits.94 These con-
tinue to be the interests protected by the contemporary law of nuis-
ance in common law jurisdictions. According to the Restatement of
Torts, "Ipirivate nuisance is properly an interference with the use
and enjoyment of land, and is a wrong only to persons who have
property rights or privileges in the land.""'5 When plaintiff's protected
interests are invaded, there is recovery not only for harm arising from
acts which affect the land and its comfortable use but also for harm
to members of the family and to chattels.
Liability for private nuisance is opposed to liability for a physical
invasion of property, as in trespass. 6 Private nuisance is a field of
liability rather than a single type of tortious conduct. The interest
protected by law, the free use and enjoyment of land, may be invaded
intentionally, unintentionally, or even accidentally. In contemporary
common law, there is no liability for accidental invasions in this
90. Id. at 217. Although an individual cannot maintain an action for a public
nuisance as such, he may maintain a private action if he has suffered special damage.
See W. PROSSER, TORTS § 88, at 586 (4th ed. 1971).
91. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS ch. 40, introductory note at 217 (1939); W. PRos-
SER, TORTS § 88, at 584 (4th ed. 1971); Burnham v. Hotchkiss, 14 Conn. 311 (1841);
Chesbrough v. Commissioners, 37 Ohio St. 508 (1882).
92. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS ch. 40, introductory note at 217 (1939); Whitte-
more v. Baxter Laundry Co., 181 Mich. 54, 148 N.W. 437 (1914).
93. This type of nuisance is at times called "mixed." Kelley v. Mayor of New
York, 27 N.Y.S. 164, 6 Misc. 516 (1894).
94. For the historical development of the law of nuisance, see W. PROSSER, TORTS
§ 86, at 571 (4th ed. 1971).
95. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS ch. 40, introductory note at 219 (1939). See also id.
§ 823.
96. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1965-1966
Term-Torts, 26 LA. L. REV. 516 (1966).
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field. " Negligent, reckless, or ultrahazardous conduct engages re-
sponsibility in this field as it does in other fields. Intentional conduct
engages responsibility if it is unreasonable and the invasion substan-
tial.5 Detailed rules in the Restatement of Torts determine processes
whereby conduct is characterised as unreasonable and the invasion
substantial.'
Nuisance in Fact and Nuisance per se
Distinction is made at times between a nuisance in fact (or per
accidens) and a nuisance per se. A nuisance in fact is a condition or
activity that is unreasonable under the circumstances. ""' A nuisance
per se (or absolute) is an activity or condition that gives rise to re-
sponsibility without regard to the care with which it is conducted or
the circumstances under which it exists."' In cases in which a defen-
dant is held responsible for an activity or condition although he has
acted reasonably in all respects, courts tend to justify the result by
saying that the activity or condition is a nuisance per se. This hap-
pens, mainly, in three types of cases: when, within constitutional
limits, the legislature has forbidden the maintenance of certain es-
tablishments or the carrying on of certain activities; when there is an
obviously unreasonable use of property in the light of the surround-
ings; and when a person conducts abnormal and unduly hazardous
activities. Resort to the notion of nuisance per se has been criticized
because it confuses issues; it is frequently the statement of a conclu-
sion reached on other grounds. "'
Louisiana Jurisprudence
Louisiana courts have frequently employed common law termi-
nology in this field, and have sought to develop an acceptable and
working definition of the word "nuisance" in the framework of civil-
ian institutions. Courts have occasionally considered the distinction
97. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS ch. 40, introductory note at 221 (1939) (liable for
accidental interferences with the use and enjoyment of land, but only for such interfer-
ences as are intentional and unreasonable, or result from negligent, reckless, or ultra-
hazardous conduct).
98. See W. PROSSER, TORTS § 87, at 577, 578, 580 (4th ed. 1971).
99. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 822, 826, 827, 828 (1939).
100. See Asphalt Prod. Co. v. Marable, 65 Ga. App. 877, 16 S.E.2d 771 (1941).
101. See Kays v. City of Versailles, 224 Mo. App. 178, 22 S.W.2d 182 (1929). A
nuisance per se is at times distinguished from one that is declared by statute. Cf.
Hundley v. Harrison, 123 Ala. 292, 26 So. 294 (1899); Simpson v. Du Pont Powder Co.,
143 Ga. 465, 85 S.E. 344 (1915).
102. See W. PROSSER, TORTS § 87, at 582 (4th ed. 1971).
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between a public and a private nuisance." 3 Cases involving acts,
constructions, or activities that might be considered as public nuis-
ances in common law jurisdictions are few and deal either with viola-
tion of statutes, ordinances, and police regutations"" or with en-
croachments on the public domain."" Most cases deal with private
nuisances, and more specifically, with the question whether an al-
leged nuisance is one per se or in fact. In a leading case, the Louisiana
supreme court declared that:
[a] nuisance at law or a nuisance per se is an act, occupation,
or structure which is a nuisance at all times and under any cir-
cumstances, regardless of location or surroundings. Nuisances in
fact or per accidens are those which become nuisances by reason
of circumstances or surroundings. . . .[W]hether a thing not a
nuisance per se is a nuisance per accidens or in fact depends upon
its location and surroundings, the manner of its conduct, or other
circumstances. " '
In a great number of cases, Louisiana courts have declared that
"a lawful business is never a nuisance per se"' 7 and that "no lawful
use made by an individual of his own property is a nuisance perse."'
The long list of acts, occupations, and structures that have been held
not to be nuisances per se includes: manufacturing plants, such as
metal works,"" paper plants,"" oil refineries,"' ice factories,"2 saw
103. See Borgnemouth Real. Co. v. Gulf Soap Corp., 212 La. 57, 31 So. 2d 488
(1947); Dodd v. Glen Rose Gas. Co., 194 La. 1, 193 So. 349 (1939); Barrow v. Gaillar-
danne, 122 La. 558, 47 So. 891 (1908); Villavaso v. Barthet, 39 La. Ann. 247, 1 So. 599
(1887); Blanc v. Murray, 36 La. Ann. 162 (1884); Billeaudeau v. Jeansonne, 149 So.
183 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1933).
104. See text at note 312 infra.
105. See Kuhl v. St. Bernard Rend. & Fert. Co., 117 La. 86, 41 So. 361 (1906);
Herbert v. Benson, 2 La. Ann. 770 (1847); Alland v. Lobau, 2 Mart. (N.S.) 317 (La.
1824).
106. Robichaux v. Huppenbauer, 258 La. 139, 150, 245 So. 2d 385, 389 (1971); cf.
Borenstein v. Joseph Fein Caterers, Inc., 255 So. 2d 800, 804 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
107. Graver v. Lepine, 161 La. 97, 100, 108 So. 138, 139 (1926). See also Crump v.
Carnahan, 155 La. 648, 99 So. 493 (1924); Woods v. Turbeville, 168 So. 2d 915 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1964); Galouye v. A.R. Blossmann, Inc., 32 So. 2d 90 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1947); Kellogg v. Mertens, 30 So. 2d 777 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1947).
108. City of New Orleans v. Lenfant, 126 La. 455, 462, 52 So. 575, 577 (1910).
109. See Froelicher v. Oswald Iron, Ltd., 111 La. 705, 35 So. 821 (1903); Ragusa
v. Americ'an Metal Wks., 97 So. 2d 683 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1957); Ellis v. Blanchard,
45 So. 2d 100 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950).
110. Cf. O'Neal v. Southern Car. Co., 216 La. 96, 43 So. 2d 230 (1949); Young v.
International Paper Co., 179 La. 803, 155 So. 231 (1934).
111. See Dodd v. Glen Rose Gas. Co., 194 La. 1, 193 So. 349 (1939); cf. Daigle v.
Continental Oil Co., 277 F. Supp. 875 (W.D. La. 1967).
112. See Irby v. Panama Ice Co., 184 La. 1082, 168 So. 306 (1936); Graver v.
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mills,'" whiskey distilleries,"' cotton.gins," 5 rendering plants,"" milk
pasteurizing plants,"7 cement plants,' sugar factories," ' ship-
yards,'2' and shellyards; 2 service establishments, such as railroads,12
freight terminals, i23 restaurants, 2 1 slaughterhouses, 25- junk yards, 21
garbage disposal plants, '2 blacksmith shops,' 21 stables, 2 laundries," '
filling stations,' commercial dog kennels, 32 commercial fishing
Lepine, 161 La. 97, 108 So. 138 (1926); Canone v. Pailet, 160 La. 159, 106 So. 730
(1926); Carbajal v. Vivien Ice Co., 158 La. 784, 104 So. 715 (1925); State ex rel. Hayes
v. City of New Orleans, 154 La. 289, 97 So. 446 (1923). Leblanc v. Orleans Ice Mfg.
Co., 121 La. 249, 46 So. 226 (1908).
113. See City of New Orleans v. Lagasse, 114 La. 1055, 38 So. 828 (1905).
114. See Lewis v. Behan, Thorn & Co., 28 La. Ann. 130 (1876).
115. See Walsworth v. Farmers Gin Co., 162 La. 246, 110 So. 338 (1926); Bankston
v. Farmers Coop. Gin, 116 So. 2d 91 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1959).
116. See Rayborn v. Smiley, 253 So. 2d 664 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971); cf. Borgne-
mouth Real. Co. v. Gulf Soap Corp., 212 La. 57, 31 So. 2d 488 (1947); City of New
Orleans v. Degelos Bros. Grain Corp., 175 So. 2d 351 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965); Kelly
v. Ozone Tung Coop, 36 So. 2d 837 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1948).
117. Cf. Crump v. Carnahan, 155 La. 648, 99 So. 493 (1924).
118. Cf. Jefferson Lbr. & Con. Prod., Inc. v. Jimco, Inc., 217 So. 2d 721 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1969).
119. Cf. Barrow v. Gaillardanne, 122 La. 558, 47 So. 891 (1908).
120. See Monlezun v. Jahncke Dry Docks, Inc., 163 La. 400, 111 So. 886 (1927).
121. See Ritchey v. Lake Charles Dreg. & Tow. Co., 230 So. 2d 346 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1970).
122. See Devoke v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 211 La. 729, 30 So. 2d 816 (1947); McGee
v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 206 La. 121, 19 So. 2d 21 (1944); City of New Orleans v. Lenfant,
126 La. 455, 52 So. 575 (1910); State v. Marshall, 50 La. Ann. 1176, 24 So. 186 (1898);
Hill v. Chicago, St. L. & N.O.R.R., 38 La. Ann. 599 (1886); cf. Morris v. Putsman,
166 La. 14, 116 So. 577 (1928) (tramway); Tucker v. Vicksburg & R.R., 125 La. 689, 51
So. 689 (1910).
123. See Beauvais v. D.C. Hall Trans., 49 So. 2d 44 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950).
124. Cf. State ex rel. Szodomka v. Gruber, 201 La. 1068, 10 So. 2d 899 (1942); Fos
v. Thomassie, 26 So. 2d 402 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1946).
125. See Howell v. Butcher's Union Slaughterhouse and Live Stk. Land. Co., 36
La. Ann. 63 (1884).
126. See City of New Orleans v. Southern Auto., 193 La. 895, 192 So. 523 (1939).
127. See Gibson v. City of Baton Rouge, 161 La. 637, 109 So. 339 (1926). Cf. Salter
v. B.W.S. Corp., 281 So. 2d 764 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
128. See City pf New Orleans v. Lambert, 14 La. Ann. 247 (1859).
129. See Robichaux v. Huppenbauer, 258 La. 139, 245 So. 2d 385 (1971); Hill v.
Battalion Wash. Art., 143 La. 533, 78 So. 844 (1918); Woods v. Turbeville, 168 So. 2d
915 (La. App. 2d dir. 1964). Cf. Dubos v. Dreyfous, 52 La. Ann. 1117, 27 So. 663 (1900);
State ex rel. Viol/tt v. King, 46 La. Ann. 78 (1894).'
130. See City of Shreveport v. Robinson, 51 La. Ann. 1314, 26 So. 277 (1899). Cf.
Di Carlo v. Laundry & Dry Clean. Serv., 178 La. 676, 152 So. 327 (1933).
131. Cf. Hilliard v. Shuff, 260 La. 384, 256 So. 2d 127 (1972); Hutson v. Continen-
tal Oil Co., 136 So. 2d 714 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961); Galouye v. A.R. Blossmann, Inc.,
32 So. 2d 406, 10 S.W.2d Cir. 1947).
132. See Robertson v. Shipp, 50 So. 2d 699 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1951).
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camps,':" and auction shops;'" funeral homes'35 and cemeteries; 36 and
entertainment establishments, such as nightclubs, 7 bowling al-
leys,"4 rodeo shows,""3 and gambling houses.4 " Not only businesses
and occupations but also lawful constructions and acts are not nuis-
ances per se in Louisiana. Thus, public works,' canals,' a combusti-
ble wooden structure for the storage of inflammable materials,' or
the storage of gasoline in above ground fuel tanks'44 are not nuisances
per se. And the same is true of the ringing of a church bell,"" or of
the keeping of domestic animals. 4"
In concrete situations, and in the light of all attending circum-
stances, Louisiana courts have held certain acts, occupations, and
constructions to be nuisances in fact. " What constitutes a nuisance
in fact is not easy to determine. The criterion is to be found in a
delicate process of balancing the social utility of a particular act,
occupation, or construction against the gravity of the harm suffered
by persons in the neighborhood. 4 " This forms the topic of the follow-
ing discussion. For purposes of accurate analysis, and in order to
avoid confusion with common law institutions, reference to "nuis-
133. Cf. Hobson v. Walker, 41 So. 2d 789 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1949).
134. See Gilly v. Hirsh, 122 La. 966, 48 So. 422 (1909).
135. See Frederick v. Brown Fun. Homes, Inc., 222 La. 57, 62 So. 2d 100 (1952);
Moss v. Burke & Trotti, Inc., 198 La. 76, 3 So. 2d 281 (1941).
136. See New Orleans v. Wardens, 11 La. Ann. 244 (1856); Musgrove v. Catholic
Church, 10 La. Ann. 431 (1855); Hardin v. Huckabay, 6 La. App. 640 (2d Cir. 1927).
137. See Scott v. Lecompte, 260 So. 2d 345 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972); cf. Koehl v.
Schoenhausen, 47 La. Ann. 1316 (1895) (concert saloon).
138. See City of Shreveport v. Leiderkrantz Society, 130 La. 802, 58 So. 578
(1912).
139. Cf. Kellogg v. Mertens, 30 So. 2d 777 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1947).
140. See De Blanc v. Mayor, 106 La. 680, 31 So. 311 (1902); Johnson v. Nora, 87
So. 2d 757 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956).
141. See Donovan v. City of New Orleans, 11 La. Ann. 711 (1856).
142. Cf. Jeansonne v. Cox, 233 La. 251, 96 So. 2d 557 (1957); Schneidau v. Louis-
iana H'way Comm'n, 206 La. 754, 20 So. 2d 14 (1944).
143. See Blanc v. Murray, 36 La. Ann. 162 (1884).
144. See Galouye v. A.R. Blossman, Inc., 32 So. 2d 90 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1947).
See also Hilliard v. Shuff, 260 La. 384, 256 So. 2d 127 (1972); Beauvois v. D.C. Hall
Transp., 49 So. 2d 44 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1952).
145. See State ex rel. Denis v. King, 105 La. 731, 30 So. 101 (1901).
146. See Woods v. Turbeville, 168 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964); Myer v.
Minard, 21 So. 2d 72 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1945).
147. See notes 156-84 infra.
148. See text at notes 235-43 infra; Blanc v. Murray, 36 La. Ann. 162 (1884); Allen
v. Paulk, 188 So. 2d 708 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966); Myer v. Minard, 21 So. 2d 72 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1945); Talbot v. Stiles, 189 So. 469 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939).
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ance" will be avoided. Instead, reference will be made to civil respon-
sibility under article 669 on account of damage or excessive inconve-
niences suffered by neighbors.
RONDO: ARTICLE 669 AND THE CIVILIAN TRADITION
Article 669 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, following the
civilian tradition,"' is designed to afford protection to owners and
other occupiers of immovable property against damage or inconveni-
ences caused by the emission of imponderabilia, such as smoke, soot,
fumes, odors, noise, vibrations, and the like. The English version of
this article refers merely to inconveniences arising from "smoke or
nauseous smell," but this is a mistranslation. The controlling'" text
of the corresponding provision in the 1825 Code 5' declares that neigh-
bors are entitled to relief if they suffer any of the "different inconveni-
ences which one neighbor may cause to another."' 52
In contrast with article 667 which directly imposes responsibility
on landowners for abuse of the right of ownership, '1 3 article 669 does
not itself establish a standard of conduct but relegates the matter to
rules of police and local "usages."'' 4 Of course, under the Civil Code,
responsibility for emissions does not depend exclusively on local regu-
lation. Under article 2315 one is clearly responsible for emissions that
149. In Roman Law, landowners had at their disposal the actio de effusis et
dejectis for damage resulting from excessive or harmful emissions. See D. 3.9. Domat,
whose text article 669 reproduces cites in Roman law sources. See DOMAT, LE LOIS
CIVILES DANS LEUR ORDRE NATUREL, 1 OEUVRES DE DOMAT 334 (Remy ed. 1828). For
bibliogr phical inf()rmation on contemporary French doctrine, see 1 MAZEAUD ET TUNC,
TRAITE DE LA RESPONSIBILITE CIVILE 685 (6th ed. 1965); for German doctrine, see
MEISNER-STERN-HODES, NACHBARRECHT 195-225 (2d ed. 1956); BAUR, SACHENRECHT 203
(2d ed. 1963); Kleindienst, Der Privatrechtliche Immissionschutz nach § 906 B.G.B.,
298/299 RECHT UNDE STAAT 1-80 (1964).
150. See Sample v. Whitaker, 172 La. 722, 135 So. 38 (1931); Straus v. City of New
Orleans, 166 La. 1035, 118 So. 125 (1928); Phelps v. Reinach, 38 La. Ann. 547 (1886).
151. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 665 (1825) (same as article 669 of the 1870 code); LA.
CiV. CODE art. 669 (comp. ed., 16 West LSA-Civ. Code, 1972, at 410): "The English
text of C.C. 1808 is a more complete and preferable translation of the French text than
the present English text."
152. LA. CIv. CODE art. 665 (1825) (same as article 669 of the 1870 Code):
ci les aut res dilterentes incommodit~s qu' un voisin peut causer I F autre .. " For
pertinent discussion, see concurring opinion by Justice Barham in Robichaux v.
Huppenbauer, 258 La. 139, 245 So. 2d 391 (1971).
153. See notes 25, 29 supra.
154. The words "customs of the place" in the English text of article 669 ought to
read "usages." For the difference between "custom" and "usage," see Yiannopoulos,
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW SYSTEM-PART I §§ 33, 37 (1971). For the proposition that article
669 authorizes municipalities to enact local ordinances, see City of New Orleans v.
Lambert, 14 La. Ann. 247 (1859).
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cause damage through his fault; and under article 667, a landowner
is responsible for emissions that cause damage or deprive a neighbor
of the enjoyment of his property, if these result from an abusive
exercise of the right of ownership. It is thus only emissions that cause
damage or inconvenience not attributed to fault or to an abusive
exercise of the right of ownership that the Civil Code relegates to local
regulation.
There are relatively few Louisiana decisions in this field dealing
with violation of local ordinances; most cases involve the question of
civil responsibility on account of emissions in the absence of pertinent
legislation. Louisiana courts, under the circumstances, might have
embarked on a search for applicable local rules. Instead, they devel-
oped an impressive body of jurisprudence anchored on article 669 but
expounding general rules of conduct and standards of civil responsi-
bility. These rules of decisional law may be best regarded today as
Louisiana customary law. Although this law is founded on article 669,
it is not local law but general, prevailing throughout the state. One
is thus justified to assert that article 669 of the Civil Code, as inter-
preted by Louisiana courts, imposes certain obligations on persons
occupying immovable property, be they landowners or not, in favor
of all persons in the neighborhood. 5  The interest protected by article
669 is the same as in common law jurisdictions and in continental
systems: the free use and enjoyment of immovable property.
In Louisiana, courts have imposed responsibility, even in the
absence of a controlling local ordinance, on account of the operation
of manufacturing plants, such as metal works,' 56 a sugar factory,' 57 a
cement plant,' a fertilizer factory, 9 a dehydrating plant,10 a render-
ing plant,'6' a tallow plant, 6 ' an oil refinery,'63 and a cotton gin;'4
155. See Yiannopoulos, Civil Responsibility in the Framework of Vicinage: Arti-
cles 667-669 and 2315 of the Civil Code, 49 TUL. L. REV. 195, 235 (1974).
156. See Froelicher v. Oswald Ironworks, Ltd., 111 La. 705, 35 So. 821 (1903);
Ragusa v. American Metal Wks., 97 So. 2d 683 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1957); Ellis v.
Blanchard, 45 So. 2d 100 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950).
157. See Barrow v. Gaillardanne, 121 La. 558, 47 So. 891 (1908).
158. See Jefferson Lbr. & Con. Prod., Inc. v. Jimco, Inc., 217 So. 2d 721 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1969); Codding v. Braswell Supp., Inc., 54 So. 2d 852 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1951).
159. See Perrin v. Crescent City Stk. & Slaughterhouse Co., 119 La. 83, 43 So.
938 (1907); Kuhl v. St. Bernard Rend. & Fert. Co., 117 La. 86, 41 So. 361 (1906).
160. See City of New Orleans v. Degelos Bros. Grain Corp., 175 So. 2d 351 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1965).
161. See Rayborn v. Smiley, 253 So. 2d 664 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
162. See Labasse v. Piat, 121 La. 601, 46 So. 665 (1908).
163. See Dodd v. Glen Rose Gas. Co., 194 La. 1, 193 So. 349 (1939).
164. See Walsworth v. Farmers Gin Co., 161 La. 246, 110 So. 338 (1926); Bankston
v. Farmers Coop. Gin, 116 So. 2d 91 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1959).
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service establishments, such as restaurants,"'5 slaughterhouses,'"
commercial dog kennels,' 7 stables,"'" railroads,' 9 freight terminals,' 70
laundries,' 7' and a blacksmith shop;' 72 and entertainment establish-
ments, such as a concert saloon,' 73 a night club,' 71 a liquor store, dance
hall, and gambling house,' 75 and a rodeo show.'76 Further, courts have
also issued injunctions or awarded damages on account of injuries or
inconveniences caused by constructions, such as a sign,' 77 a fence,' 71
a wooden structure for the storage of combustible materials, '17 a brick
kiln,"'"' a canal,'6 ' and a vine planter;"'2 and on account of activities
such as the operation of a tramway on public streets"'3 and the keep-
ing of domestic animals without appropriate measures for the comfort
of neighbors."'" On the other hand, in the light of all the attending
circumstances, Louisiana courts have refused to award injunctive
relief or damages to persons injured or inconvenienced on account of
a variety of acts, constructions, or occupations on neighboring prop-
erty. The list of cases includes manufacturing plants, such as ice
165. See Fos v. Thomassie, 26 So. 402 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1946).
166. See Villavasso v. Barthet, 39 La. Ann. 247, 1 So. 599 (1887); Bileaundeau v.
Jeansonne, 149 So. 183 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1933).
167. See Robertson v. Shipp, 50 So. 2d 699 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1951); Roche v. St.
Romain, 51 So. 2d 666 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951); Talbot v. Stiles, 189 So. 469 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1939).
168. See Robichaux v. Huppenbauer, 258 La. 139, 245 So. 2d 385 (1971); Dubos
v. Dreyfous, 52 La. Ann. 1117, 27 So. 663 (1900); State ex rel. Violett v. King, 46 La.
Ann. 78 (1894).
169. See Devoke v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 211 La. 729, 30 So. 2d 816 (1947); McGee
v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 206 La. 121, 19 So. 2d 21 (1944); Tucker v. Vicksburg S. & P.
Ry., 125 La. 689, 51 So. 689 (1910).
170. Beauvais v. D.C. Hall Transp., Inc., 49 So. 2d 44 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950).
171. See Di Carlo v. Laundry & Dry Clean. Serv., 178 La. 676, 152 So. 327 (1933).
172. See City of New Orleans v. Lambert, 14 La. Ann. 247 (1859).
173. See Koehl v. Schoenhauser, 47 La. Ann. 1316 (1895).
174. See Scott v. Lecompte, 260 So. 2d 345 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
175. Johnson v. Nora, 87 So. 2d 757 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956).
176. See Kellogg v. Mertens, 30 So. 2d 777 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1947).
177. See Gilly v. Hirsh, 122 La. 966, 48 So. 422 (1909).
178. See Parker v. Harvey, 164 So. 507 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935).
179. See Blanck v. Murray, 36 La. Ann. 162 (1884).
180. See Fuselier v. Spalding, 2 La. Ann. 773 (1847).
181. See Schneidau v. Louisiana H'way Comm'n., 206 La. 754, 20 So. 2d 14
(1944); Brunning v. New Orleans Canal & Bank. Co., 12 La. Ann. 541 (1857); Keay v.
New Orleans Canal & Bank. Co., 7 La. Ann. 259 (1852).
182. See Borenstein v. Joseph Fein Caterers, Inc., 255 So. 2d 800 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1971).
183. See Kuhl v. St. Bernard Rend. & Fert. Co., 117 La. 86, 41 So. 361 (1906).
184. See Allen v. Paulk, 188 So. 2d 708 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966); Talbot v. Stiles,
189 So. 469 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939); cf. Marks v. Luce, 1 Orl. App. 107 (1904).
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plants, ' a carbon plant,'5 ' a milk pasteurizing plant,"" a whiskey
distillery,"' a saw mill,""' and a shellyard;'90 service establishments,
such as a restaurant,'l9 a railroad,'92 a commercial fishing camp,'9 and
a fish bait business; 94 constructions, such as an unsightly fence,' 5
and a canal;"' and acts, such as ringing of church bells' or the
keeping of domestic animals."' Seemingly conflicting judicial deter-
minations may, of course, be fully reconciled in the light of different
circumstances and considerations of social or individual utility
weighing the scale of justice."
In France, even in the absence of a provision in the Code Civil
corresponding with article 669 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870,
courts have developed a body of law imposing a sort of special respon-
sibility without negligence on landowners for damage or inconveni-
ences suffered by neighboring landowners. 90 Responsibility has been
imposed on owners of large industrial plants as well as on the owners
of neighborhood establishments, such as bakeries, coal yards, and
hatcheries.2" There is clearly responsibility on account of emissions
of smoke, heat, noise, light, odors, dust, vapor, vibrations, and the
like;2"" but French courts have also imposed responsibility even in the
185. See Irby v. Panama Ice Co., 184 La. 1082, 168 So. 306 (1936); Meyer v.
Kemper Ice Co., 180 La. 1037, 158 So. 378 (1934); LeBlanc v. Orleans Ice Mfg. Co.,
121 La. 249, 46 So. 226 (1908).
186. See O'Neal v. Southern Car. Co., 216 La. 96, 43 So. 2d 230 (1949).
187. See Crump v. Carnahan, 155 La. 648, 99 So. 493 (1924).
188. See Lewis v. Behan, Thorn & Co., 28 La. Ann. 130 (1876).
189. See Allen v. Albright, 151 So. 2d 554 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
190. See Ritchey v. Lake Charles Dredg. & Tow. Co., 230 So. 2d 346 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1970).
191. See State ex ret. Szodomka v. Gruber, 201 La. 1068, 10 So. 2d 899 (1942); cf.
City of Shreveport v. Leiderkrantz Society, 130 La. 802, 58 So. 578 (1912) (bowling
alley).
192. See Werges v. St. Louis, Chicago & N.O.R.R., 35 La. Ann. 641 (1883).
193. See Haynes v. Smith, 85 So. 2d 326 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956).
194. See Hobson v. Walker, 41 So. 2d 789 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1949).
195. See Williams v. Beverly, 160 So. 2d 291 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964); cf. Wolff v.
Stewart, 48 La. Ann. 1431, 20 So. 908 (1896).
196. See Jeansonne v. Cox, 233 La. 251, 96 So. 2d 557 (1957).
197. See Woods v. Turbeville, 168 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964) (horses);
Myer v. Minard, 21 So. 2d 72 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1945) (rooster).
198. See State ex rel. Denis v. King, 105 La. 731, 30 So. 101 (1901).
199. See text at notes 235-43 infra.
200. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITE PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 454 (2d ed.
Picard 1952); 1 MAZEAUD ET TUNC, TRAITE DE LA RESPONSABILITE CIVILE 685 (6th ed.
1965); 2 CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL 153 (5th ed. 1967).
201. See Orleans, [18891 D. 1891.2.120; Cass. Req., [1905] D. 1905.1.256; Tours,
119041 D. 1905.2.199; Cass. Req., [19041 D. 1905.1.77.
202. For a comprehensive survey of contemporary French jurisprudence in this
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absence of any physical invasion or physical damage to property and
persons. Thus, the owner of a theater or of a casino may be responsi-
ble not only on account of damage and inconveniences caused by
nocturnal noise and the coming and going of customers, but also on
account of the increased danger of fire in the neighborhood. 0 3 The
owner of a house of ill repute may be responsible on account of the
moral outrage and the resulting diminution of property values in the
neighborhood,"" and the owner of a private clinic that treats patients
suffering from contagious diseases may be responsible on account of
the fear of spread of the disease.' 5 Railroads have been compelled to
pay damages resulting from vibrations, smoke, and fires caused by
cinders, though not for damages resulting from the construction of
the track. 2 1"" Owners of mines, which are distinct immovables in
France, have been charged with responsibility for damage resulting
from land slides and pollution of waters.2 "7  And the state and its
political subdivisions have been compelled by administrative tri-
bunals to pay damages for harms caused by public works for the
construction of aqueducts, railroads, and highways, provided that the
damage is directly attributed to these works.
2
1
8
In Germany, Greece, and other civil law jurisdictions, provisions
in civil codes declare that an owner, in the absence of contrary provi-
sions of law or rights of others, is entitled to use his property as he
sees fit and to exclude any interference by third personsA0' However,
insofar as immovable property is concerned, the scope of the provi-
field, see 1 MAZEAUD ET TUNC, TRAITE DE LA RESPONSABILITE CIVILE 690-92 (6th ed. 1965).
It is interesting to note that courts have imposed responsibility on the owner of trees,
the leaves of which fall on the roofs of neighboring buildings or the roots of which injure
the foundations of neighboring buildings: Civ., [19531 D. 1953, 573, S. 1954. 1. 67;
Civ., 119561 D. 1957 somm. 22; Civ., 119651 D. 1965.432; on the builder of a house
which because of its exceptional height rendered useless the chimneys of neighboring
buildings: Civ., 119641 D. 1965.321 (note by Esmein); and on the owner of a luminous
sign which interfered with the enjoyment of neighboring projects; Feb. 8, 1932, Gaz.
Pal. 1932.1.511.
203. See Cass. Req., 118651 D. 1866.1.35, S. 1866.1.402; Bordeaux, [18671 D.
1869.2.159; Marseille, 119051 D. 1905.5.38:
204. See Civ., 118601, D. 1861.1.331, S. 1861.1.840; Civ. 118611, D. 1861.1.334;
Req., 18841, D. 1885.1.231.
205. See Limoges, 119021, La Loi, April 29, 1902.
206. See Civ., 118661, D. 1866.1.439, S. 1867.1.77; Toulouse, 119021 S.
1905.2.105 (note by Appert); Trib. Laval. 119211, Ga'z. Pal. 1922.1.604.
207. See Besancon, 119351, Gaz. Pal. 1936.1.227.
208. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITE PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAiS 458 (2d ed.
Picard 1952).
209. See B.G.B. § 903; GREEK Civ. CODE art. 1000.
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sions is tempered by the duty of a landowner to tolerate reasonable
emissions of smoke, dust, heat, odors, vibrations, and the like, from
neighboring property.2 '" Obviously, a landowner could not possibly
exclude all interferences with the enjoyment of his property because
this would amount to a prohibition against the use of neighboring
property. A landowner may effectively protect his interest in the
comfortable use of his property by injunctions designed to restrain
unreasonable or excessive emissions and by actions designed to repair
the damage that he may have suffered on account of such emis-
sions."'
Nature of Responsibility
The nature of civil responsibility under article 669 has not been
discussed extensively in Louisiana decisions and in the legal litera-
ture. Several courts and scholars have regarded this article as a
source of delictual responsibility equivalent to the liability for nuis-
ance under the common law of tort."2 The Louisiana supreme court,
however, has repeatedly stated that an action under article 669 "is
not one in tort, but, rather, one that springs from an obligation im-
posed upon property owners by the operation of law so that all may
enjoy the maximum of liberty in the use and enjoyment of their
respective properties."2" ' It has been pointed out elsewhere that this
is legal responsibility, but its incidents are best determined by analo-
gous application of the rules governing delictual responsibility."1 4
According to well-settled Louisiana jurisprudence, the responsi-
bility under article 669 of the Civil Code does not depend on inten-
tional fault, negligence, or ultrahazardous activities.115 It is a species
of responsibility without negligence, and, perhaps, without fault,
clearly distinguishable from the responsibility Under articles 2315
and 667 of the Civil Code. The view that an occupier of land may be
responsible only on account of intentional misconduct, abuse of right,
210. See B.G.B. § 906; GREEK CIv. CODE art. 1003; cf. Swiss CIv. CODE art. 684;
ITALIAN CIV. CODE art. 844.
211. See B.G.B. § 1004; GREEK Civ. CODE art. 1108. For the protection of owner-
ship in Germany and in Greece by the negatory action, the possessory action, and
actions for damages, see YIANNOuPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY §§ 150-53 (1966).
212. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1965-66 Term-Torts,
26 LA. L. REV. 510, 516 (1966).
213. Fontenot v. Magnolia Petro. Co., 227 La. 866, 879, 80 So. 2d 845, 849 (1955);
Devoke v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 211 La. 729, 743, 30 So. 2d 816, 821 (1947).
214. See Yiannoupoulos, Civil Responsibility in the Framework of Vicinage: Arti-
cles 667-669 and 2315 of the Civil Code, 49 TUL. L. REV. 195, 212 (1974).
215. See Devoke v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 211 La. 729, 30 So. 2d 816 (1947); Bankston
v. Farmers Coop. Gin, 116 So. 2d 91 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1959).
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negligence, violation of ordinances, and ultrahazardous activities
might be acceptable prior to the era of industrial revolution." In the
course of the nineteenth century, however, the relations among neigh-
bors were profoundly modified by the transformation of the economy.
A rupture of equilibrium has been generally experienced in the use
of lands as commercial and industrial establishments proliferated in
cities and in the countryside, and inevitable conflicts of interests
ensued. Quite frequently, the operations of commercial or industrial
establishments produce emissions of smoke, odors, noise, heat, vapor,
or vibrations that cause damage or annoy persons in the neighbor-
hood. These emissions may be entirely unavoidable. The landowner
or other occupier of land may have used the property diligently, he
may have complied with laws and regulations, and he may have
taken all the requisite measures to avoid unnecessary emissions. He
may not be reproached for any fault or abuse of right. His activities
are lawful and socially desirable as they contribute to the develop-
ment of the economy. Nevertheless, a landowner or other occupier of
land may be civilly responsible to persons in the neighborhood under
article 669 for the damage and inconveniences that he has caused by
his operations.
Foundation of Responsibility
It is the role of doctrine to ascertain the foundation of civil re-
sponsibility under article 669, namely, to explain why a landowner
or other occupier of land is responsible under this article on account
of harms that he has inflicted to persons in the neighborhood. Aware
of the solutions reached by courts in a great number of cases, and
mindful of the nature of law in a codified system, doctrine must seek
formulas that are sufficiently broad to encompass all reported cases,
and, at the same time, sufficiently flexible to fit Louisiana's civilian
heritage. It might be easy to state that one is responsible in Louis-
iana, as in sister states, because he has created a private nuisance.
Such a statement, however, would be an analytically useless proposi-
tion because "nuisance" has defied attempts at accurate definition.
It is advisable, therefore, to seek the foundation of civil responsibility
for insufferable inconveniences in fundamental precepts that form
the backbone of the civilian tradition.
216. Until the first quarter of this century, however, certain Louisiana decisions
expressed the view that damages could be claimed under article 669 only if they were
intentionally or negligently inflicted. See Morris v. Putsman, 166 La. 14, 116 So. 577
(1928); Hill v. Chicago, St. L., & N.O.R.R., 38 La. Ann. 599, 601 (1886); Werges v. St.
Louis, Chicago, & N.O.R.R., 35 La. Ann. 641 (1883). See also Eclipse Towboat v.
Pontchartrain R.R., 24 La. Ann. 1, 12 (1872).
[Vol. 34
OBLIGATIONS OF VICINAGE
Violation of Obligations of Vicinage
Suggestion may be made that every landowner is bound by cer-
tain obligations of vicinage prohibiting him from causing damage or
inconvenience to neighbors, and that the breach of these obligations
constitutes fault and generates responsibility under article 2315 of the
Civil Code."1 7 Pothier has postulated the existence of such obliga-
tions: "Vicinage obliges every landowner to use his property in such
a manner as not to cause damage to his neighbor. The rule must be
understood in the sense that although every one has the liberty to do
whatever he sees fit on his property, he can do nothing that could
cause damage to his neighbor." 18 Provisions in the Louisiana Civil
Code and in the French Civil Code allude to these obligations. ',9
The notion of the obligations of vicinage has been subjected to
criticism in France. 1 Doubts have been voiced whether the Code
Civil actually establishes such obligations, and critics have pointed
out that the obligations of vicinage, even if they existed, would not
furnish an acceptable criterion of responsibility. No one has been able
to determine the content and extent of the obligations of vicinage
with any degree of precision. These obligations could not be unquali-
fied, because, if this were the case, they would be in effect a prohibi-
tion against the use of property. It has been maintained by certain
writers that the obligations of vicinage are violated only when a
neighbor causes substantial damage to his neighbors. This appar-
ently plausible limitation, however, is inaccurate because, in certain
circumstances, a landowner may cause substantial damage to his
neighbors without incurring any responsibility; for example, when he
obscures the view of his neighbors by raising a building 21 or when he
drains by a well on his property a common underground reservoir 22
of water or minerals.2
2 3
217. Cf. Selle v. Kleamenakis, 142 So. 2d 50, 51 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962); Bruno
v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 67 So. 2d 920, 923 (La. App. Orl. Cir, 1953); Capitant,
Des Obligations de voisinage, et specialement del obligation qui pese sur le proprietaire
de ne causer aucun dommage a son voisin, 29 REV. CRIT. 156, 228 (1900); VERSESCO,
ETUDE GENERALE SUR LES RESTRICTIONS APPORTEES A LA PROPRIETE FONCIERE (Diss. Paris
1901).
218. Pothier, De la Societe No. 235, IV OEUVRES DE POTHIER 330 (ed. Bugnet 1861).
219. See FRENCH CIv. CODE arts. 651, 1370; LA. CIV. CODE arts. 659, 666, 2292.
220. See 2 CoL.IN, CAPIrANT ET JULLIOT DE LA MORANDIERE, TRAITE DE DROIT CIVIL
90 (1959); 1: PLANIOI, ET RIPERT, TRArrE PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 461 (2d ed.
Picard 1952).
221. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 668(2); cf. Cass. Req., [18851, D. 1855.1.390.
222. See Adams v. Grigsby, 152 So. 2d 619 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963); Cass Req.,
118861, S. 1887.1.373; Cass. Req., [19251, D.H. 1925.686.
223. See McCoy v. Arkansas Nat. Gas Co., 175 La. 487, 143 So. 383 (1932);
19741
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Certain French writers have also explained the landowner's spe-
cial responsibility in the framework of vicinage on the basis of the
notion of risk.2 ' When a use of property involves predictable risks,
one who reaps the benefits ought to compensate neighboring lan-
downers for the damage or inconveniences that they have suffered.
According to this view, responsibility rests on a broadened conception
of fault. Fault is not found in the noxious act, which may well be the
exercise of a right, but in the refusal to pay compensation for harms
suffered by neighbors. From this point of view, there is a rapproche-
ment with the idea of obligations of neighborhood. If it is true that
responsibility based on fault presupposes the violation of an obliga-
tion, one may say that the law imposes on a landowner the obligation
to use his property upon payment of a compensation to neighbors who
suffer damage or are excessively inconvenienced. The use of the prop-
erty is socially useful and, therefore, permissible; but it entails an
obligation to pay compensation because, in effect, it results in partial
expropriation of the rights of another owner.225
Abuse of Right
It has been suggested in France, and language in several Louis-
iana decisions may be taken to suggest, that responsibility for insuf-
ferable inconveniences or damage in the framework of vicinage rests
on the notion of abuse of right."' A landowner or other occupier of
land is responsible because he has abused his right, and only to the
extent that the damage or inconveniences suffered by neighbors are
caused by the abusive exercise of the right. Thus, in a case involving
a demand for injunctive relief against inconveniences resulting from
the operation of a saw mill in the vicinity, the court dismissed the
action seemingly on the ground that defendant did not abuse his right
of ownership. In the course of the opinion, the court declared: "A
person has the right to use his property in any way he sees fit so long
as he does not violate any positive law, but he cannot abuse this
privilege by unduly interfering with the rights of his neighbors."2 7
Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 145 La. 233, 82 So. 206 (1919).
224. JOSSERAND, DE L'ESPRIT DES DROITS ET DE LEUR RELATIVITE : THEORIE DITE DE
I 'ABus sDE DROITs 21 (2d ed. 1939); Note, D. 1923.2.53; cf. Ripert, Note D. 1907.1.385.
225. See IV DEMOGUE, TRAITE DES OBLIGATIONS EN GENERAL 421 (1924).
226. See 2 COLIN, CAPITANT ET JULLIOT DE LA MORANDIERE, TRAITE DE DROIT CIVIL
91 (1959); Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 145 La. 233, 235, 82 So. 206,
207 (1919); D'Albora v. Tulane Univ., 274 So. 2d 825, 832 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973);
Woods v. Turbeville, 168 So. 2d 915, 916 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964); Allen v. Albright,
151 So. 2d 554, 556 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
227. Allen v. Albright, 151 So. 2d 554, 556 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
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In France, the doctrine of abuse of right has given rise to an
abundant literature but has been sparingly applied by the courts.
According to French jurisprudence, there is responsibility for abuse
of right merely in cases in which one uses his right with the intention
to cause damage to another without benefit to himself or when one
uses his right without serious and lawful motive.228 Judicial decisions
imposing responsibility for damage or insufferable inconveniences in
the framework of vicinage go far beyond these limits. In certain cir-
cumstances, the pursuit of a lawful occupation gives rise to claims for
damages, if it endangers health or property or if it causes damage or
inconvenience to persons in the neighborhood, without any showing
of fault or abusive exercise of the right of ownership. An owner who
exploits a mine, a factory, a railroad, or a theatre, may be responsible
in certain circumstances because he has used his property in an ex-
ceptional manner insofar as a particular neighborhood is concerned,
but this does not mean that he has done violence to the purposes for
which the law recognises the right of ownership in immovable prop-
erty.
229
The foregoing considerations are also pertinent for Louisiana.
The notion of abuse of right is fully acceptable as the foundation of
responsibility under article 667 of the Civil Code, but is insufficient
to explain the jurisprudence imposing responsibility under article
669.
Exceptional Use of Property
A careful study of Louisiana jurisprudence leads to the conclu-
sion that a landowner or other occupier of land is responsible under
article 669 because he has used the property in an exceptional manner
that is unreasonable under the circumstances.2 0 The same idea
evolves from the study of decisions in continental legal systems and
in common law jurisdictions. It is the idea that Jhering expressed last
century: "everything appertaining to ordinary life is permitted ...
One is not allowed, however, to exceed the normal measure of what
is tolerable.""'' Modern civil codes reflect Jhering's formulation.
228. See Paris, 119411, Gaz. Pal. 1941.2.490. See also Josserand, DE L'ESPRIT DES
DROIrS IT DE lEUR RELATIVITE: THEORIE-DITE DE L'ABUs DES DROITS 24 (2d ed. 1939);
Notes, D. 1913.2.177; D. 1923.2.169.
229. See 3 PIANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITE PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 462 (2d ed.
Picard 1952).
230. See Moss v. Burke & Trotti, 198 La. 76, 3 So. 2d 281 (1941); Blanc v. Murray,
36 La. Ann. 162 (1884).
231. Jhering, Zur Lehre von den Beschrankungen des Grundeigentumers im Inter-
esse der Nachbarn, 6 JHERINGS JAHRBUCHER 81, 122, 123 (1863).
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Thus, article 684 of the Swiss Civil Code imposes responsibility on a
landowner who exceeds "the limits of tolerance due by neighbors, in
view of the local usage, and the situation and nature of the immova-
bles. '2 1 2 Simply stated, one who does not use his property in accord-
ance with the prevailing conditions at the time and place is civilly
responsible because, by making an exceptional use, he has destroyed
the equilibrium that existed among the neighboring estates. 33
Whether a particular use of property is exceptional or unreasona-
ble under the circumstances is a question of fact. 234 Determination is
made in the light of all the circumstances, including the character of
a particular neighborhood, the destination of each immovable, prior
use, existing economic conditions, the nature and extent of damage
or inconveniences suffered by neighbors, and the availability or cost
of techniques of correction.
The character of the neighborhood is relevant in a variety of
contexts. Certain activities which inherently tend to disturb people
cannot be excluded from all areas. These activities may be tolerable
in the open country or in a sparsely populated area though not in a
city.235 Moreover, "in a populous part of a city greater precaution
must be taken to avoid inflicting annoyances, discomfort, and dis-
tress, than in the open country. ' ' 236 When a commercial or industrial
establishment is located in a city, courts consider the character of the
particular neighborhood because a use of property that may be nor-
mal in one neighborhood may be entirely abnormal in another. As a
matter of fact, a particular neighborhood may be exclusively residen-
tial, partly residential and partly commercial or industrial, or pre-
dominantly commercial or industrial. In an exclusively residential
neighborhood courts are likely to impose responsibility even if plain-
tiffs inconvenience is relatively slight by the standards prevailing in
a partly commercial or industrial neighborhood. In a partly commer-
cial or partly industrial neighborhood, in which there are various
sources of inconvenience, courts are likely to minimize the import-
ance of the particular source of inconvenience of which plaintiff com-
232. See also B.G.B. § 906; GREEK CIV. CODE art. 1003.
233. See :3 PIANIOI, ET RIPERT, TRAITE PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 464 (2d ed.
Picard 1952); cf. Douai, 118541, D. 1855.2.26; Agen, [18551, D. 1855.2.302; Cass.
Req., 118751, S. 1875.1.352; Cass Req., 119011, D. 1901.1.356.
234. See McGee v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 206 La. 121, 19 So. 21 (1944). See also
Robichaux v. Huppenbauer, 258 La. 139, 245 So. 2d 385 (1971); Borgnemouth Real.
Co. v. Gulf Soap Corp., 212 La. 57, 31 So. 2d 488 (1947); Crump v. Carnahan, 155 La.
648, 99 So. 49:3 (1924); Woods v. Turbeville, 168 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
235. See O'Neal v. Southern Car. Co., 216 La. 96, 43 So. 2d 230 (1949); Robertson
v. Shipp, 50 So. 2d 699 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1951).
236. Tucker v. Vicksburg & P.R.R., 125 La. 689, 698, 51 So. 689, 698 (1910).
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plains 2 1 unless his inconvenience is extreme in character. 29 One who
resides in a commercial or industrial neighborhood is expected to
tolerate certain inconveniences.
The law does not recognise a right in the pre-occupation of im-
movable property, namely, one may not avoid responsibility because
he began using his property in a certain manner at a time in which
there were no other residents around. 239 However, when a great num-
ber of persons use property in the same way in a given locality, they
determine what constitutes normal use; and if this use is commercial
or industrial, one who builds his residence in the neighborhood has
no ground to complain of certain inconveniences. 20 But if only one
or few persons use property in an exceptional manner, this use, how-
ever ancient that it may be, remains exceptional and newcomers as
well as other owners may have grounds to complain. 24' In certain
237. In Graver v. Lepine, 161 La. 97, 108 So. 138 (1926), plaintiff was refused relief
when he complained of the erection of an ice plant in an area in which a larger one
was already in operation; and in Irby v. Panama Ice Co., 184 La. 1082, 168 So. 306
(1936), plaintiff was refused relief when he complained of the slight noises coming from
an industrial plant located in a neighborhood abounding in other noises and
disturbances.
238. See Froelicher v. Oswald Iron, Ltd., 111 La. 705, 35 So. 821 (1903). Even if
the area is zoned commercial, a person operating a business establishment may have
a cause of action on account of insufferable inconveniences resulting from the operation
of other establishments. See Jefferson Lbr. & Con. Prod., Inc. v. Jimco, Inc., 217 So.
2d 721 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
239. See Robertson v. Shipp, 50 So. 2d 699, 706 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1951): "[The
right to conduct a business in such a way or manner as to amount to a nuisance may
not be prescribed for"; Ellis v. Blanchard, 45 So. 2d 100 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950);
Tucker v. Vicksburg & P.R.R., 125 La. 689, 51 So. 689 (1910). For corresponding
solutions in France, see Civ., [1907] D. 1907.1.385, S. 1908. 2.175; Civ., [19351, Gaz.
Pal. 1935.2.950; Solus, Note, 35 REv. TRIM. DR. Civ. 209 (1936). Plaintiff's prior loca-
tion, however, is "a factor to be considered." Ritchey v. Lake Charles Dredg. & Tow.
Co., 230 So. 2(d 346, :150 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
240. See Ritchey v. Lake Charles Dredg. & Tow. Co., 230 So. 2d 346, 351 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1970): "[Alny one who builds a residence near a navigable river should expect
a certain amount of noise from vessels and unloading operations"; Kelly v. Ozone Tung
Coop, :16 So. 2d 837, 842 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1948) (damages may not be recovered by
plaintiff who moved into the property "well aware of the conditions then existing");
Monlezun v. Jahncke Dry Docks, Inc., 163 La. 400, 111 So. 886 (1927) (locality fit and
expected to be used by factories). For corresponding solutions in France, see Algiers,
118981, D. 1899.2.6, S. 1899.2.107; Civ., [19071, D. 1907.1.385; Bordeaux, [19031, D.
19(8.2.49, Note, Capitant, S. 1905.2.41, Appert, Note.
241. See Jefferson Lbr. & Con. Prod., Inc. v. Jimco, Inc., 217 So. 2d 721 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1969); Ellis v. Blanchard, 45 So. 2d 100 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950); cf. Tucker v.
Vicksburg & P.R.R., 125 La. 689, 51 So. 689 (1910). The presence of other disturbances
is not a valid defense. See Beauvais v. D.C. Hall Transp., 49 So. 2d 44 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1950). Nor does license by the authorities constitute a valid defense. See LeBlanc
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instances, however, newcomers may have a lesser right to compensa-
tion than persons who were in the neighborhood prior to the establish-
ment of' the noxious operation." 2 Courts thus balance the relative
rights of the parties and generally impose responsibility in cases in
which the harm suffered by plaintiff outweighs the social utility of
defendant's operations. 43 The Restatement of Torts contains detailed
rules designed to assist and guide common law courts in their deter-
mination whether a particular use of property is reasonable or unrea-
sonable."' Louisiana courts, however, may also be guided by their
own precedents and by continental doctrine and jurisprudence.
An exceptional use of property, however unreasonable that it
may be, does not alone suffice to engage responsibility. A landowner
or other occupier of land is responsible in Louisiana only when his
exceptional use of the property causes damage or excessive inconveni-
ence to persons of normal sensibilities. 45 The concept of excessive
inconvenience, like that of exceptional use, is a relative one. An in-
convenience may be excessive in the light of the conditions prevailing
in a certain neighborhood though not excessive in the light of the
conditions prevailing elsewhere in town. The Louisiana supreme
court has declared that noises and vibrations from the operation of
machinery cannot involve responsibility "unless they are excessive
and unreasonable, depending on the location of the establishment; its
relation to other property, and particularly to other sources of noise
or vibration.""24 If the inconvenience from smoke, odors, noise, or
other emissions is not excessive under the circumstances, there is no
v. Orleans Ice Mfg. Co., 121 La. 249, 46 So. 226 (1908); Kuhl v. St. Bernard Rend. &
Fert. Co., 117 La. 86, 41 So. 361 (1906); Salter v. B.W.S. Corp., 281 So. 2d 764 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1973).
242. See Daigle v. Continental Oil Co., 277 F. Supp. 875, 881 (W.D. La. 1967):
"It almost goes without saying that the claimants who owned homes near the plant
before operations began are entitled to a higher award for damages than those who
bought in the area after the plants were put in production." For corresponding solu-
tions in France, see Lyon, [1887], D. 1888.2.239; Nancy, [19231, Gaz, Pal. May 30,
1923.
243. For excellent analysis, see Blanc v. Murray, 36 La. Ann. 162 (1884); Allen v.
Paulk, 188 So. 2d 708 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966); Myer v. Minard, 21 So.2d 72 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1945); Talbot v. Stiles, 189 So. 469 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939).
244. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 826-31 (1939).
245. See text at note 250 infra; Galouye v. A.R. Blossmann, Inc., 32 So. 2d 90, 92
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1947): "A lawful business cannot be abated ... unless the business
is operated in such a way as to give rise to serious and material discomfort and
inconvenience to those living in close proximity thereto." Cf. 1 MAZEAUD ET TuNc,
TRAITE DE LA RESPONSABILITE CIVILE 689 (6th ed. 1965).
246. Irby v. Panama Ice Co., 184 La. 1082, 168 So. 306, 309 (1936); cf. I MAZEAUD
ET TUNC, TRAITE DE LA RESPONSABILITE CIVILE 694 (6th ed. 1965).
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relief; it is a mere inconvenience within the meaning of article 668 of
the Civil Code.247 Early Louisiana decisions indicate that when an
establishment is located by permit of the public authorities, and is
operated in conformity with existing regulations, unavoidable noise,
odors, vibrations, and the like must be considered as an inconveni-
ence to which neighbors must submit for the public good.24 More
recent decisions, however, seem to award damages even if the incon-
venience is entirely unavoidable. 49 Determination whether an incon-
venience is excessive is made in accordance with objective standards.
The applicable measure is that of discomfort experienced by persons
of normal sensibilities.250 The Louisiana supreme court has suggested
a test on the basis of this question: "is the discomfort one of mere
fastidiousness or extreme refinement, as is sometimes seen, or does
. . . [it] interrupt the average comfort to which the individual has
the right?" ''
Louisiana decisions indicate that there is responsibility under
article 669 only in situations in which persons in the neighborhood
experience "material" or "physical" discomfort. 52 If the discomfort
is not one experienced "through the medium of the senses, 253 there
may be no recovery. This is, perhaps, a much too narrow interpreta-
tion of article 669. In common law jurisdictions, there is responsibility
on account of establishments that disturb the peace of mind, such as
bawdy houses, funeral homes, and hospitals. 254 Similar solutions have
been reached in France. 255 In Germany and in Greece, however, a
landowner has no standing to complain of merely "ideal" invasions
of his property, namely, on account of operations on neighboring
247. See Morris v. Putsman, 166 La. 14, 116 So. 577 (1928); Hill v. Chicago, St.
L., & N.O.R.R., 38 La. Ann. 599 (1886); Lewis v. Behan, Thorne & Co., 28 La. Ann.
130 (1876); D'Albora v. Tulane Univ., 274 So. 2d 825, 832 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973);
Hobson v. Walker, 41 So. 2d 789 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1949).
248. See Le Blanc v. Orleans Ice Mfg. Co., 121 La. 249, 46 So. 226 (1908); Hill v.
Chicago, St. L. and N.O.R.R., 38 La. Ann. 599, 607 (1886); Lewis v. Behan, Thorne &
Co., 28 La. Ann. 130 (1876).
249. See Devoke v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 211 La. 729, 30 So. 2d 816 (1947); Froe-
licher v. Southern Mar. Wks., 118 La. 1077, 43 So. 882 (1907); Beauvis v. D.C. Hall
Trans., 49 So. 2d 44 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950).
250. See McGee v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 206 La. 121, 19 So. 2d 21, 25 (1944); Woods
v. Turbeville, 168 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964); Hobson v. Walker, 41 So. 2d 789
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1949). See also Scott v. Lecompte, 260 So. 2d 345 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1972); Kellogg v. Mertens, 30 So. 2d 777 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1947).
251. Froelicher v. Oswald Iron., Ltd., 111 La. 705, 35 So. 821, 822 (1903).
252. See Moss v. Burke & Trotti, 198 La. 76, 3 So. 2d 281, 285 (1941); Hobson v.
Walker, 41 So. 2d 789, 795 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1949); Galouye v. A.R. Blossman, Inc.,
32 So. 2d 90 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1947).
253. Moss & Trotti, 198 La. 76, 3 So. 2d 281, 283 (1941).
254. See W. PROSSER, TORTS § 89, at 592 (4th ed. 1971).
255. See text at notes 203-04 supra.
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property that depress his feelings or cause fear or shame. There may
be responsibility on account of such operations under the rules of
delictual obligations or in circumstances in which they cause physical
discomfort by excessive emissions. ' This is also true in Louisiana:
there should be no doubt that a landowner, as any other person, may
have a cause of action under article 2315 of the Civil Code on account
of non-physical invasions of his interests, and that a landowner has
a right to complain of non-physical invasions of his property under
article 667, if a neighbor abuses his right of ownership. 5 '
ARTICLE 669: ACTIONS FOR DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIONS
Article 669 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, as interpreted
by Louisiana courts, imposes responsibility on landowners and
other occupiers of land who use property in an exceptional manner
that is unreasonable under the circumstances. This responsibility
is imposed in favor of persons in the neighborhood who suffer
damage or excessive inconveniences. According to well-settled
Louisiana jurisprudence, the violation of the duties imposed by
article 669 gives rise to claims for both injunctive relief and dam-
ages.""0 These claims may be cumulated in the same action."" De-
pending on the circumstances, an aggrieved party may be entitled
to both damages and injunctive relief, 10 damages only,2"' injunctive
256. See MEISNER-STERN-HODES, NACHBARRECHT 518 (3d ed. 1956); BALIS, CIVIL
LAW PROPERTY 96 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek); but cf. BAUR, SACHRECT 206 (2d ed. 1963).
257. See text at note 52 supra.
258. See, e.g., Dodd v. Glen Rose Gas. Co., 194 La. 1,193 So. 349 (1940); Di Carlo
v. Laundry & Dry Clean. Serv., 178 La. 676, 152 So. 327 (1933); Ritchey v. Lake
Charles Dredg. & Tow. Co., 230 So. 2d 346 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970); Myer v. Minard,
21 So. 2d 72 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1945). Aggrieved parties, however, may choose to bring
an action for damages only: see, e.g., Union Fed. Sav. & Loan v. 451 Florida Corp.,
256 So. 2d 358 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971); Haneman v. Deep S. Dis. Co., 185 So. 2d 81
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1966); Bankston v. Farmers Coop. Gin, 116 So. 2d 91 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1959); or for injunctions only: City of New Orleans v. Lagasse, 144 La. 1055, 38
So. 828 (1905); Crump v. Carnahan, 155 La. 648, 99 So. 493 (1924); City of New Orleans
v. Degelos Bros. Grain Corp., 175 So. 2d 351 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965); Allen v. Albright,
151 So. 2d 554 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
259. See LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 461, 462; note 21 supra.
260. See McGee v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 206 La. 121, 19 So. 2d 21 (1944); Di Carlo
v. Laundry & Dry Clean. Serv., 178 La. 676, 152 So. 327 (1933); Labasse v. Piat, 121
La. 601, 46 So. 665 (1908); Kuhl v. St. Bernard Rend. & Fert. Co., 117 La. 86, 41 So.
361 (1906); Froelicher v. Oswald Iron., Ltd., 111 La. 705, 35 So. 821 (1903); Rayborn
v. Smiley, 253 So. 2d 664 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
261. See Schneidau v. Louisiana H'way Comm'n., 206 La. 754, 20 So. 2d 14
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relief' only,262 or to neither injunctive relief nor damages.' "
Damages
The violation of the duties imposed by article 669 has given rise
to claims for damages for past inconveniences, 26 1 structural damage
to property, and depreciation of land values. All reported Louisiana
decisions involved awards of damages on account of excessive emis-
sions, such as smoke, soot, odors, noise, vibrations, and the like. No
case has been found in which an award was made under article 669
on account of damage or inconveniences resulting from other than
physical invasions of property.
In actions governed by article 669, damages are most frequently
awarded to compensate persons in the neighborhood for the excessive
inconveniences that they have suffered. 65 These damages have been
(1944); Dodd v. Glen Gas. Co., 194 La. 1, 193 So. 349 (1940); Long v. Louisiana Creos.
Co., 137 La. 862, 69 So. 281 (1915); Froelicher v. Southern Mar. Wks. 118 La. 1077, 43
So. 882 (1907). See text at note 311 infra.
262. See Walsworth v. Farmers Gin Co., 161 La. 246, 110 So. 338 (1926); Perrin
v. Crescent City Stk. & Slaughterhouse Co., 119 La. 83, 43 So. 938 (1907).
263. See Jeansonne v. Cox, 233 La. 251, 96 So. 2d 557 (1957); O'Neal v. Southern
Car. Co., 216 La. 96, 43 So. 2d 230 (1949); Moss v. Burke & Trotti, 198 La. 76, 3 So.
2d 281 (1941); Irby v. Panama Ice Co., 184 La. 1082, 168 So. 306 (1936); Young v.
International Paper Co., 179 La. 803, 155 So. 231 (1934); Spyker v. International Paper
Co., 173 La. 580, 138 So. 109 (1931); Morris v. Putsman, 166 La. 14, 116 So. 577 (1928);
Monlezun v. Jahncke Dry Docks, Inc., 163 La. 400, 111 So. 886 (1927).
264. Cf. Stone, Tort Doctrine in Louisiana: The Obligations of Neighborhood, 40
TUL. L. Rv. 701, 708 (1966): "Should the neighbor recover all his damages, past,
present, and future in one action, or should he be required to bring an action periodi-
cally for the damages then occasioned?" In France, courts ordinarily prescribed mea-
sures for the avoidance of future damage by means of an astreinte. When damages are
continuous, courts may award to an owner a rent rather than a lump sum, payable for
as long as the prejudice subsists. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAIrE PRATIQUE DE DROIT
CIVIL FRANCAIs 467 (2d 3d. Picard 1952). Louisiana courts have awarded a rent in lieu
of damages in cases in which a wall or other construction encroaches on neighboring
property. See Dupuy Stor. & For. Corp. v. Cowan, 216 So. 2d 610 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1969).
265. See Devoke v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 211 La. 729, 30 So. 2d 816 (1947); Dodd
v. Glen Rose Gas. Co., 194 La. 1, 193 So. 343 (1940); Labsase v. Piat, 121 La. 601, 46
So. 665 (1908); Kuhl v. St. Bernard Rend. & Fert. Co., 117 La. 86, 41 So. 361 (1906);
Froelicher v. Oswald Iron. Ltd., 111 La. 705, 35 So. 821 (1908); Brunning v. New
Orleans Canal Co., 12 La. Ann. 541 (1857); Rayborn v. Smiley, 253 So. 2d 664 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1971); Bankston v. Farmers Coop. Gin, 116 So. 2d 91 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1959); Beauvais v. D.C. Hall Transp., 49 So. 2d 44 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950); Galouye
v. A.R. Blossman, Inc., 32 So. 2d 90 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1947). Of course, damages for
excessive inconveniences may also be recovered under article 2315 of the Civil Code.
See Marks v. Luce, 1 Orl. App. 101 (La. App. 1904) (barking dog). For responsibility
under article 667, see Gotreaux v. Gary, 232 La. 373, 94 So. 2d 293 (1957); Sharon v.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
likened to those due on account of mental anguish. ' Responsibility
for payment is attached to the person who is responsible "for the
existence of the condition,"2 "' be he landowner or other occupier of
land. Attorney's fees are not recoverable.6 "
Occasionally, damages are also awarded under article 669 for
structural damage to property."' Diminution of the value of a partic-
ular tract of land is clearly recoverable in actions brought under
article 2315 of the Civil Code,"" and ought to be also recoverable in
cases in which there is responsibility under article 667 or 669.21 Such
demands have been made accessorily in a number of cases involving
physical damage to property or inconveniences caused by emis-
sions,2"2 but there is no reported case in which damages were clearly
Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 270 So. 2d 900 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
266. See McGee v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 206 La. 121, 19 So. 2d 21 (1944); Bankston
v. Farmers Coop. Gin, 116 So. 2d 91 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1959); cf. Labasse v. Piat, 121
La. 601, 46 So. 665 (1908).
267. Borenstein v. Joseph Fein Caterers, Inc., 255 So. 2d 800, 806 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1971).
268. See Borgnemouth Real. Co. v. Gulf Soap Corp., 212 La. 57, 31 So. 2d 488
(1947); Fos v. Thomassie, 26 So. 2d 402 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1946).
269. See Devoke v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 211 La. 729, 30 So. 2d 816 (1947); Di Carlo
v. Laundry & Dry Clean. Serv., 178 La. 676, 152 So. 327 (1933); Codding v. Braswell
Supp., Inc., 54 So. 2d 852 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1951); Kelly v. Ozone Tung Coop, 36 So.
2d 837 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1948); see also Froelicher v. Southern Mar. Wks., 118 La.
1077, 43 So. 882 (1907); Froelicher v. Oswald Iron., Ltd., 111 La. 705, 35 So. 821 (1903).
For actions involving recovery under article 667 or 2315 for damages caused by emis-
sions, see Wichers v. New Orleans Acid & Fert. Co., 128 La. 1011, 55 So. 657 (1911)
(damage caused by fumes, gases, and acid through the fault of the defendant); Meyer
v. Kemp Ice Co., 180 La. 1037, 158 So. 378 (1934) (damage resulting from vibrations
is recoverable even if defendant's operation is not a "nuisance").
270. In such actions, plaintiff must prove that the loss is due to the fault of the
defendant. See McCoy v. Arkansas Nat. Gas Corp., 191 La. 332, 185 So. 274 (1938)
(claim for damages on account of the depreciation of property due to the depletion of
a common underground gas reservoir; no recovery in the absence of proof of fault).
271. Even a non-physical invasion that results in diminution of the value of a tract
of land gives rise to an action for damages, at least when the injury is inflicted mali-
ciously or by an abusive exercise of the right of ownership. See Higgins Oil & Fuel Co.
v. Guaranty Oil Co., 145 La. 234, 82 So. 206 (1919); Adams v. Grigsby, 152 So. 2d 619
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1963); cf. McCoy v. Arkansas Nat. Gas Co., 184 La. 101, 165 So. 632
(1936).
272. See Borgnemouth Real. Co. v. Gulf Soap Corp., 212 La. 57, 31 So. 2d 488
(1947); Schneidau v. Louisiana H'way. Comm'n., 206 La. 754, 20 So. 2d 14 (1944);
Dodd v. Glen Rose Gas. Co., 194 La. 1, 193 So. 349 (1940); Morris v. Putsman, 166
La. 14, 116 So. 577 (1918); Walsworth v. Farmers Gin Co., 161 La. 246, 110 So. 338
(1926); Orton v. Virginia Carol. Chem. Co., 142 La. 790, 77 So. 632 (1918); Labasse v.
Piat, 121 La. 601, 46 So. 665 (1908); Froelicher v. Southern Mar. Wks., 118 La. 1077,
43 So. 882 (1907); Froelicher v. Oswald Iron, Ltd., 111 La. 705, 35 So. 821 (1903); Hill
v. Chicago, St. L. & N.O.R.R., 38 La. Ann. 599 (1886); Lewis v. Behan, Thorn & Co.,
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awarded for the diminution of land values. Galouye v. A.R. Bloss-
man, Inc. ,273 might, perhaps, be cited for the proposition that diminu-
tion of the value of the land is a recoverable element of damage. In
this case, action was brought for injunction to restrain the storage of
liquified petroleum gas near plaintiff's property and for damages for
mental anguish and for depreciation of property. The court, exercis-
ing its "discretion," awarded $1,000 without specification as to the
basis of the award. The opinion as a whole, however, the discretionary
nature of the award, and the amount of compensation, support the
conclusion that the basis of reparation was plaintiff's inconvenience
and mental suffering.
In a number of cases, Louisiana courts refused damages for the
diminution of land values on the basis of a finding that acts, con-
structions, or activities did not violate the obligations imposed by
articles 667 and 669, and, therefore, the depreciation of property val-
ues was damnum absque injuria.14 In other cases, the issue whether
diminution of land value is a recoverable element of damage was
obviated by a finding that plaintiff failed to prove damage of this
nature,27 5 that the damage was temporary, and, therefore, not re-
28 La. Ann. 130 (1876); Beauvais v. D.C. Hall Transp., 49 So. 2d 44 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1950); Galouye v. A.R. Blossman, Inc., 32 So. 2d 90 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1947). Excep-
tionally, however, claims for diminution of the value of lands have been made without
allegations concerning physical invasion of property. See Jeansonne v. Cox, 233 La.
251, 96 So. 2d 557 (1957); Blanc v. Murray, 36 La. Ann. 162 (1884). In a number of
cases, injunctions rather than damages were sought on the ground that non-physical
invasions would result in depreciation of land values. In these cases, Louisiana courts
declared that such claims may not sustain injunctive relief. See Frederick v. Brown
Fun. Homes, Inc., 222 La. 57, 62 So. 2d 100 (1952); Moss v. Burke & Trotti, 198 La.
76, 3 So. 2d 281 (1941); Hardin v. Huckabay, 6 La. App. 640 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1927).
273. 32 So. 2d 90 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1947). The matter of diminution of land values
has also arisen in Louisiana decisions dealing with expropriation of property for public
utility. Under the law of eminent domain, a landowner whose land has been taken for
public utility has the right to claim severance or consequential damages suffered by
his remaining property. In Schneidau v. Louisiana Highway Commission, 206 La. 754,
20 So. 2d 14 (1944), a landowner brought action to recover actual damages resulting
from the taking of land for highway construction as well as for the depreciation of his
land on account of the presence on his property of an open borrow pit. The court
properly found that the borrow pit was a "nuisance in fact" and that plaintiff's prop-
erty had depreciated in value. Accordingly, it made an award for both actual and
consequential damages. See also Texas Pip. Co. v. National Gas. Co., 203 La. 787, 14
So. 2d 636 (1943); cf. Gulf States Util. Co. v. Comeaux, 182 So. 2d 187 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1966); Kendall v. State, 168 So. 2d 840 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
274. See Jeansonne v. Cox, 233 La. 251, 96 So. 2d 557 (1957); Moss v. Burke &
Trotti, 198 La. 76, 3 So. 281 (1941); Morris v. Putsman, 166 La. 14, 116 So. 577 (1928);
Hill v. Chicago, St. L. & N.O.R.R. Co., 38 La. Ann. 599 (1886); Hardin v. Hackabay,
6 La. App. 640 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1927).
275. See Borgnemouth Real. Co. v. Gulf Soap Corp., 212 La. 57, 31 So. 2d 488
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
coverable,276 or that the claim for damage was lost by prescription.277
Additionally, in a number of cases courts chose not to discuss at all
claims for diminution of land values . 27 8
Perhaps, one thing is certain: diminution of land values, though
unquestionably caused by acts, constructions, or activities on neigh-
boring property does not support an award of damages under article
669 in the absence of allegations and proof of a physical invasion of
property by excessive emissions. In Jeansonne v. Cox, 27 an action was
brought by landowners against neighboring landowners who had a
street paved and a canal dug on their properties. The demand was
for a mandatory injunction to compel the closing of the canal, and,
in the alternative, for damages for the depreciation of properties on
account of the close proximity of the canal. The court noted that all
cases cited by plaintiffs involved "nuisances or physical invasion of
property" whereas
[i]n the present case there is no claim of physical damage or
physical invasion of the property of the plaintiffs nor is there any
allegation that the canal is a nuisance.
There being no physical damage, the only testimony relied
upon by plaintiffs is that the presence of the canal greatly depre-
ciated the value of the property. In this respect the evidence is
contradictory, some witnesses testifying that, its presence did in
fact depreciate the property while other witnesses testified that
its presence did not depreciate the value of the property. After
considering all the facts in this case, we have come to the conclu-
sion that the plaintiffs have failed to establish that they have
suffered any recoverable damage under the laws of this state.2 80
The denial of an award of damages did not merely rest on lack of
proof of damages; it rested equally on the ground that this species of
damages is not recoverable under article 669 in the absence of a
physical invasion of property resulting in structural damage or in
(1947); Dodd v. Glenn Rose Gas. Co., 194 La. 1, 193 So. 349 (1940); Labasse v. Piat,
121 La. 601, 46 So. 665 (1908); cf. Jeansonne v. Cox, 233 La. 251, 96 So. 2d 557 (1957).
276. See Walsworth v. Farmers Gin Co., 161 La. 246, 110 So. 338 (1926); Orton v.
Virginia Carol. Chem. Co., 142 La. 790, 77 So. 632 (1918).
277. See Beauvais v. D.C. Hall Transp., 49 So. 2d 44 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950).
278. See Froelicher v. Southern Mar. Wks., 118 La. 1077, 43 So. 882 (1907); Kuhl
v. St. Bernard Rend. & Fert. Co., 117 La. 86, 41 So. 361 (1906); Froelicher v. Oswald
Iron., Ltd., 111 La. 705, 35 So. 821 (1903); Blanc v. Murray, 36 La. Ann. 162 (1884);
Kelly v. Ozone Tung Coop., 36 So. 2d 837 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1948).
279. 23:3 La. 251, 96 So. 2d 557 (1957).
280. Id. at, 258, 96 So. 2d at 559.
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excessive physical discomfort.
Actions for damages brought under article 669 may be defended
on a variety of grounds, including lack of causal connection,",' lack
of proof of damage, 2 ' and liberative prescription."' Ordinarily, the
main line of defense is that the obligations imposed by article 669
have not been violated, namely, the use of property is not exceptional
or unreasonable under the circumstances,"' and has not caused ex-
cessive inconvenience to neighbors. 5 License by the authorities is not
a valid defense, 85 nor the allegation that there are other sources of
noxious emissions. 87 Likewise, antiquity of the use is not a valid
defense, because one cannot acquire by acquisitive prescription the
right to use his property in a9 unreasonable manner and thereby to
cause with impunity damage or excessive inconveniences to his
neighbors. 8
Injunctions
Article 669 clearly authorizes injunctions for the suppression of
acts, constructions, and activities on neighboring property that cause
damage or excessive inconveniences to neighbors. Question arises,
281. See O'Neal v. Southern Car. Co., 216 La. 96, 43 So. 2d 230 (1949); Daigle v.
Continental Oil Co., 277 F.2d 875 (5th Cir. 1967); Eastern Air v. American Cyanamid
Co., 231 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1963).
282. See Monlezun v. Jahncke Dry Docks, Inc., 163 La. 400, 111 So. 886 (1927);
Labasse v. Piat, 121 La. 601, 46 So. 665 (1908); Perrin v. Crescent City Stk. &
Slaughterhouse Co., 119 La. 83, 43 So. 938 (1907); Werges v. St. Louis, Chicago &
N.O.R.R. Co., 35 La. Ann. 641 (1883).
283. See Young v. International Paper Co., 179 La. 803, 155 So. 231 (1934); Spyker
v. International Paper, 173 La. 580, 138 So. 109 (1931).
284. See Morris v. Putsman, 166 La. 14, 116 So. 577 (1928); Monlezun v. Jahncke
Dry Docks, Inc., 163 La. 400, 111 So. 886 (1927); Ritchey v. Lake Charles Dred. & Tow.
Co., 230 So. 2d 346 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970); Hobson v. Walker, 41 So. 2d 789 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1949); Hardin v. Hackabay, 6 La. App. 640 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1927).
285. See Jeansonne v. Cox, 233 La. 251, 96 So. 2d 557 (1957); Irby v. Panama Ice
Co., 184 La. 1082, 168 So. 306 (1936); LeBlanc v. Orleans Ice Mfg. Co., 121 La. 249, 46
So. 226 (1908); Hill v. Chicago, St. Louis & N.O.R.R. Co., 38 La. Ann. 599 (1886);
Werges v. St. Louis, Chicago & N.O.R.R. Co., 35 La. Ann. 641 (1883); Lewis v. Behan,
Thorn & Co., 28 La. Ann. 130 (1876); Myer v. Minard, 21 So. 2d 72 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1945).
286. See LeBlanc v. Orleans Mfg. Co., 121 La. 249, 46 So. 226 (1908); Kuhl v. St.
Bernard Rend. & Fert. Co., 117 La. 86, 41 So. 361 (1906); cf. Salter v. B.W.S. Corp.,
281 So. 2d 764 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
287. See Beauvais v. D.C. Hall Transp., 49 So. 2d 44 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950). Even
if the area is zoned commercial, there may be responsibility for insufferable inconveni-
ences caused by an exceptional use. See Jefferson Lbr. & Con. Prod., Inc. v. Jimco,
Inc., 217 So. 2d 721 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
288. See note 239 supra.
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however, whether the same article authorizes injunctions against
acts, constructions, and activities that may be expected to cause
damage or excessive inconveniences.
Since at least the middle of last century, parties have brought
actions in Louisiana for preventive injunctions under article 669.9 In
an early case, the court declared that preventive injunction will not
lie against the establishment of a lawful business "except in cases
where its establishment will occasion imminent danger or irreparable
injury, or at least where there is no question that the erection will be
a nuisance violative of legal right."290 In case of imminent danger or
irreparable injury, injunction will lie today under article 3601 of the
Code of Civil Procedure 9' But the question remains whether injunc-
tive relief is available under article 669 against the establishment of
a lawful business that may give rise to excessive inconveniences in the
absence of special legislation, local ordinances, servitudes, building
restrictions, or contractual agreements. Not a single case has been
found in which a lawful act, construction, or activity was prevented
by application of article 669. Louisiana courts have refused to issue
injunctions under this article forbidding the location in exclusively
residential areas of cemeteries,2 9 2 funeral homes,2  stables, 294 ice
plants, '1 a fishing camp,20 a cistern making business,297 and a slaugh-
terhouse.2 11 Stated in terms of nuisance, Louisiana courts have consis-
289. See Fuselier v. Spalding, 2 La. Ann. 773 (1847). Cf. B.G.B. § 907(1); GREEK
Civ. CoiD art. 1004: "The owner of immovable property is entitled to forbid the con-
struction or maintenance of establishments on neighboring property, if it is expected
with certainty that their existence or use will give rise to an unlawful interference with
his right of ownership." Preventive injunction does not lie under German or Greek law
when an establishment is made in accordance with a license by the authorities. Id.
B.G.B. 907(2); CREEK CIV. CODE art. 1005.
290. Bell v. Riggs & Bros., 38 La. Ann. 555, 556 (1886).
291. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 3601. Comment (a) under this article indicates that "the
jurisprudential rules governing the circumstances under which an injunction issues are
not changed." See also art. 3663; LA. Civ. CODE arts. 856-69; Stone, Tort Doctrine in
Louisiana: The Obligations of Neighborhood, 40 TUL. L. REV. 701, 706-08 (1966).
292. See City of New Orleans v. Wardens, 11 La. Ann. 244 (1856); Musgrove v.
Catholic Church, 10 La. Ann. 431 (1855); Hardin v. Huckabay, 6 La. App. 640 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1927).
293. See Frederick v. Brown Fun. Homes, Inc., 222 La. 57, 62 So. 2d 100 (1953);
Moss v. Burke & Trotti, 198 La. 76, 3 So. 2d 281 (1941).
294. Lewis v. Sandell, 118 La. 852, 43 So. 526 (1907); Hill v. Batallion Wash. Art.,
143 La. 533, 78 So. 844 (1918).
295. See Graver v. Lepine, 161 La. 97, 108 So. 138 (1926); Canone v. Pailet, 160
La. 159, 106 So. 730 (1926); Carbajal v. Vivien Ice Co., 158 La. 784, 104 So. 715 (1925).
296. See Haynes v. Smith, 85 So. 2d 326 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956).
297. See Bell v. Riggs & Bros., 38 La. Ann. 555 (1886).
298. See Howell v. Butchers' Union Slaughterhouse & Live Stk. Land. Co., 36 La.
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tently declared that a lawful use of property is not a nuisance per se,2 "1
and that the location of a lawful business in a residential area may
not be enjoined for fear that it would be a nuisance in fact.3 "
Dicta in a number of cases indicate that a preventive injunction
may be granted when there is sufficient proof that a prospective
business or construction will be operated in such a manner as to cause
excessive physical inconveniences.'" Thus, in Moss v. Burke &
Trotti,0 2 the Louisiana supreme court indicated that a preventive
injunction may be issued upon proof that the operation of a prospec-
tive business "by its very nature . . . shall physically annoy the
inhabitants." In Frederick v. Brown Funeral Homes, Inc. ,10 however,
the same court seemed inclined to adopt the rule that unless the
establishment and operation of a business "is prohibited by rules of
police or customs of the place, it cannot be prohibited prior to its
operation."
Most frequently, actions for injunctive relief under article 669 are
brought to remove constructions already erected or to restrain the
operation of a business after it is established. The basis of the action
for injunctive relief is the same as in actions for damages, namely, a
complaint that a neighbor is using his property in an exceptional
manner that is unreasonable under the circumstances and causes
damage or excessive inconvenience to plaintiff. Not only inconveni-
ences arising from the diffusion of "smoke and nauseous" smells but
any of the "different inconveniences which one neighbor may cause
to another" 04 may support injunctive relief under article 669.
Ann. 63 (1884).
299. See text at notes 107-46 supra.
300. In Graver v. Lepine, 161 La. 97, 108 So. 138 (1926), the court declared that a
"lawful business is never a nuisance per se, and no one has the right to prevent the
establishment for fear that it might be conducted so as to become a nuisance." See
also Canone v. Pailet, 160 La. 159, 106 So. 730 (1926). Cf. Carbajal v. Vivien Ice Co.,
158 La. 784, 104 So. 715 (1925). There an action for injunction to prevent the establish-
ment of an ice plant was answered with an exception of no cause of action. The
exception was overruled on the ground that evidence may show that the prospective
business may be a nuisance in fact.
301. See Hill v. Batallion Wash. Art., 143 La. 533, 78 So. 844 (1918) (stable);
Lewis v. Sandell, 118 La. 852, 43 So. 526 (1907) (stable); City of New Orleans v.
Wardens of the Church, 11 La. Ann. 244 (1856) (cemetery); Haynes v. Smith, 85 So.
2d 326 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956) (fishing camp); Harding v. Huckabay, 6 La. App. 640
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1927) (cemetery); cf. Howell v. Butchers' Union Slaughterhouse and
Live Stk. Land. Co., 36 La. Ann. 63 (1884) (slaughterhouse).
302. 198 La. 76, 3 So. 2d 281 (1941) (funeral home).
303. 222 La. 57, 62 So. 2d 100 (1953) (funeral home).
304. Note 152 supra. Even a thing of beauty may be an actionable inconvenience.
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Injunctive relief under article 669, as in the case of article 667,
is available without the historical limitations of equity jurisprud-
ence. :" Thus, it is not "necessary" to plead and prove irreparable
injury."" Nevertheless, injunctions under article 669, in contrast with
injunctions under article 667, are not a matter of right."" There may
be instances in which an inconvenienced party may be entitled to
damages only; for example, when substantial redress may be accom-
plished by the payment of money and issuance of an injunction would
subject defendant to disproportionate hardship,10 or when defendant
has taken all the appropriate measures to prevent harm."" When the
choice is between suppressing a lawful activity altogether on the
ground that it causes unavoidable damage or inconvenience to neigh-
bors, and allowing it to continue upon payment of a compensation to
neighbors,3 "1 courts, balancing the relative rights of the parties, and
Borenstein v. Joseph Fein Caterers, Inc., 255 So. 2d 800 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972). In
Robichaux v. Huppenbauer, 258 La. 139, 245 So. 2d 385 (1971), plaintiffs complained
of intolerable stench, noise, and pest-attracting filth resulting from the operation of a
stable in a thickly settled neighborhood and prayed for an injunction. The majority
opinion was that article 669 was only partially applicable-to nauseous smells
only-and, in order to grant relief resorted to common law notions of nuisance. In a
convincing and methodically sound concurring opinion, Justice Barham pointed out
that the result was fully compatible with article 669, properly interpreted.
:305. See text at note 70 supra.
30t6. lorenstein v. Joseph Fein Caterers, Inc., 255 So. 2d 800, 805 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1972). See also City of New Orleans v. Degelos Bros. Grain Corp., 175 So. 2d 351
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
307. C1 RES'TATrMENT OF TORTS ch. 40, introductory note at 224 (1939).
:308. See Young v. International Paper Co., 179 La. 803, 155 So. 231 (1934); Busby
v. International Paper Co., 95 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. La. 1951).
:309. The careful and efficient manner in which defendant conducts the disturbing
activities may be a decisive factor in his favor. Thus, plaintiff was refused injunctive
relief when the noises produced by an ice plant were unavoidable: Irby v. Panama Ice
Co., 184 La. 1082, 168 So. 306 (1936); when spark arresters on a tramway were of the
most modern type: Morris v. Putsman, 166 La. 14, 116 So. 577 (1928); when a laundry
used some of the best equipment available: Olsen v. Tung, 179 La. 760, 155 So. 16
(1934); when a carbon plant was equipped with the most modern machinery available:
O'Neal v. Southern Car. Co., 216 La. 96, 43 So. 2d 230 (1949); when a shellyard's
equipment was "of the usual type and in satisfactory condition": Ritchey v. Lake
Charles Dred. & Tow. Co., 230 So. 2d 346 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970); when the under-
ground tanks of a filling station "were installed in the most approved modern manner
and method": Beauvais v. D.C. Hall Transp., 49 So. 2d 44 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950). In
Ravborn v. Smiley, 253 So. 2d 664, 665 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971), an injunction was
issued upon proof that equipment existed "which, if installed at defendant's plant,
might completely alleviate the conditions complained of." It is for the defendant rather
than the court to ascertain which are the appropriate measures for the avoidance of
inconveniences. See McGee v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 206 La. 121, 19 So. 2d 21 (1944).
31) Cf. 3 PLANIOL. ET RIPERT, TRAIrE PRATIQUE DE DROIT Civil, FRANCAIS (2d ed.
Picard 1952); Paris, 119041, D. 1905.2.32. In France, courts may not absolutely enjoin
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taking into account considerations of social or private utility, may
reach the conclusion that the activity ought to be allowed to con-
tinue. 1'
Injunctive relief under article 669 is available only to the extent
that it is needed to correct a situation. Most cases in which Louisiana
courts have ordered the closing down of a business by means of an
absolute injunction involve violation of rules of law other than article
669, such as city ordinances," 2 or violation of real rights, such as
building restrictions."3 Likewise, most cases in which courts have
restrained certain acts absolutely" or ordered the removal of certain
constructions"5 involve infraction of duties other than those imposed
the operation of a business that is subject to administrative control. They may pre-
scribe only reasonable measures, provided that they do not render impossible the
operation of the business and that they are not in conflict with the measures prescribed
by the administration in the general interest. Cass. Req., [18681 D. 1868.1.486, S.
1869.1.114.
311. For cases in which damages were awarded but the court refused to issue an
injunction, see Schneidau v. Louisiana Hwy Comm'n, 206 La. 754, 20 So. 2d 14 (1944);
Dodd v. Glen Rose Gas. Co., 194 La. 1, 193 So. 349 (1940); Long v. Louisiana Creos.
Co., 137 La. 862, 69 So. 281 (1915); Kelly v. Ozone Tung Coop, 36 So. 2d 837 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1948); Galouye v. A.R. Blossman, Inc., 32 So. 2d 90 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1947).
See also Gibson v. City of Baton Rouge, 161 La. 637, 109 So. 339 (1926). In this case,
the court refused injunctive relief because the city was disposing of garbage by the only
available means. But the court indicated that damages could be recovered if proved.
312. See State ex rel. Dema Real. Co. v. Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 123 So. 314 (1929);
Perrin v. Crescent City Stk. & Slaughterhouse Co., 119 La. 83, 43 So. 938 ( 1907);
Board of Aldermen v. Norman, 51 La. Ann. 736, 25 So. 401 (1899); Vilavaso v. Barthett,
:9 La. Ann. 247, 1 So. 599 (1887); Crescent City Live Stk. Slaughterhouse Co. v.
Larrieux, :30 La. Ann. 798 (1878); State v. Judge, 29 La. Ann. 870 (1877); City of N.O.
v. Lambert, 14 La. Ann. 247 (1859); Kennedy v. Phelps, 10 La. Ann. 227 (1855); cf.
Billeaudeau v. Jeansonne, 149 So. 183 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1933). Of course, a municipal
ordinance denouncing or regulating activities must be constitutional. For cases involv-
ing the question of the constitutionality of applicable ordinances, see City of New
Orleans v. Southern Auto Wreckers, 193 La. 895, 192 So. 523 (1939); State ex rel. Hayes
v. New Orleans, 154 La. 289, 97 So. 446 (1923); Osborn v. City of Shreveport, 143 La.
932, 79 So. 542 (1918); City of N.O. v. Lenfant, 126 La. 455, 52 So. 575 (1910); City of
New Orleans v. Lagasee, 114 La. 1055, 38 So. 828 (1905); De Blanc v. Mayor, 106 La.
680, 31 So. :311 (1902); City of Shreveport v. Robinson, 51 La. Ann. 1314, 26 So. 277
(1899).
313. See, e.g., Roche v. Roumain, 51 So. 2d 666 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951)(dog
kennels).
314. See Kuhl v. St. Bernard Rend. & Fert. Co., 117 La. 86, 41 So. 361 (1906)
(operating tramway on public street); Fuselier v. Spalding, 2 La. Ann. 773 (1847)
(burning of dangerous brick kiln); Salter v. B.W.S. Corp., 281 So. 2d 764 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1973) (dumping dangerous chemical).
315. See, e.g., Parker v. Harvey, 164 So. 507 (La, App. 2d Cir. 1935)(fence); Gilly
v. Hirsh, 122 La. 966, 48 So. 422 (1909)(sign). Cf Borenstein v. Joseph Fein Caterers,
Inc. , 255 So. 2d 800 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972). In this case, plaintiffs complained that
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by article 669. In contrast with common law jurisdictions, in which a
private person cannot sue for abatement of a public nuisance unless
he has suffered special damage, in Louisiana any citizen may sue to
remove an encroachment from the public domain"'6 or to close down
a business or other activity that is conducted in violation of a city
ordinance."'
In extremely few cases, Louisiana courts have issued absolute
injunctions prohibiting the operation of a lawful business on account
of the insufferable inconveniences inflicted upon neighbors."' In the
absence of a controlling city ordinance or other provisions of law or
contract, courts have ordinarily issued modified injunctions designed
to correct the manner in which a business activity was conducted."'
Such injunctions have been issued to restrain in certain respects the
manner of operation of manufacturing establishments, such as metal
works,320 a sugar plant, 3' a cotton gin,3 22 a cement factory,2 3 a de-
hydrating plant, 34 and a rendering plant;3 25 and of service establish-
ments, such as a restaurant, 32 a night club, 37 a concert saloon,3"8
defendant's raised planter caused moisture to accumulate and deteriorate the base of
a common wall and that a large vine caused damage to plaintiff's roof and walls. The
court issued an injunction enjoining defendant from permitting these conditions to
continue.
'16. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 861; Kuhl v. St. Bernard Rend. & Fert. Co., 117 La.
86, 41 So. 361 (1906); Hebert v. Benson, 2 La. Ann. 770 (1847); Alland v. Lobau, 2
Mart. (N.S.) 317 (La. 1824).
317. See State ex rel. Dema Real. Co. v. Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 123 So. 314 (1929);
State ex rel. Dema Real Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613 (1929); Perrin v.
Crescent City Stk. & Slaughterhouse Co., 119 La. 83, 43 So. 938 (1907); Vilavaso v.
Barthet, 39 La. Ann. 247, 1 So. 599 (1887); City of New Orleans v. Lambert, 14 La.
Ann. 247 (1859); Kennedy v. Phelps, 10 La. Ann. 227 (1855). But cf. Hutson v. Conti-
nental Oil Co., 136 So. 2d 714 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
318. See Kellogg v. Mertens, 30 So. 2d 777 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1947)(rodeo shows);
Talbot v. Stiles, 189 So. 469 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939) (dog kennels).
319. See Blanc v. Murray, 36 La. Ann. 162 (1884). See also Crump v. Carnahan,
155 La. 648, 99 So. 493 (1924); State ex rel. Violett v. King, 46 La. Ann. 78, 14 So. 423
(1894).
320. Sc Froelicher v. Oswald Iron., Ltd., II1 La. 705, 35 So. 821 (1903); Ragusa
v. American Metal Wks., 97 So. 2d 683 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1957); Ellis v. Blanchard,
45 So. 2d 100 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950).
321. See Barrow v. Gaillardanne, 122 La. 558, 47 So. 891 (1909).
322. See Walsworth v. Farmers Gin Co., 161 La. 246, 110 So. 338 (1926).
323. See Jefferson Lbr. & Con. Prod., Inc. v. Jimco, Inc., 217 So. 2d 721 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1969).
324. See City of New Orleans v. Degelos Bros. Grain Corp., 175 So. 2d 351 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1965).
325. Rayborn v. Smiley, 253 So. 2d 664 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
326. See Fos v. Thomassie, 26 So. 2d 402 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1946).
327. See Scott v. LeCompte, 260 So. 2d 345 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
:28. See Koehl v. Schoenhousen, 47 La. Ann. 1316, 17 So. 809 (1895); Johnson v.
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stables," 9 commercial dog kennels, a33 and railroads. 3 1 Injunctions
have also been issued to restrain the use of certain facilities for the
storage of fuels in an objectionable manner, 32 and the keeping of
domestic animals without measures assuring neighbors the comforta-
ble enjoyment of their properties. 3 3
Actions for injunctive relief under article 669 may be defended
on a variety of grounds, the most prominent of which is that the acts,
constructions, or activities complained of do not violate the duties
imposed by this article. 34 When injunctive relief is demanded by
virtue of a local ordinance, the question of the legality or illegality of
the ordinance is raised. 35 License by the authorities, 36 excessive fin-
Nora, 87 So. 2d 757 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956)(liquor store, dance hall, and gambling
house).
329. See Dubos v. Dreyfous, 52 La. Ann. 1117, 27 So. 663 (1900); State ex rel.
Violett v. King, 46 La. Ann. 78, 14 So. 423 (1894). In Robichaux v. Huppenbauer, 258
La. 139, 245 So. 2d 385 (1971), the Louisiana supreme court correctly held that in the
absence of violation of a city ordinance the stable operator should be permitted to
continue his operations under an injunction requiring him to spray the ground with
disinfectants and deodorizers, to cover feed bins, to remove wastes daily, to limit the
number of horses to ten, and to keep the premises drained.
330. See Robertson v. Shipp, 50 So. 2d 699 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1951).
3:31. See McGee v. Yazoo & M.VR.R., 206 La. 121, 19 So. 2d 21 (1944). See
Tucker v. Vicksburg & S.P.R.R., 125 La. 689, 51 So. 689 (1910).
332. See Blanc v. Murray, 36 La. Ann. 162 (1884); Cf. Hilliard v. Shuff, 260 La.
384, 256 So. 2d 127 (1972).
333. See Allen v. Paulk, 188 So. 2d 708 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
334. See Jeansonne v. Cox, 233 La. 1, 96 So. 2d 557 (1957); O'Neal v. Southern
Car. Co., 216 La. 96, 43 So. 2d 230 (1949); Borgnemouth Real Co. v. Gulf Soap Corp.,
212 La. 57, 31 So. 2d 488 (1947); State ex rel. Szodomka v. Gruber, 201 La. 1068, 10
So. 2d 899 (1943); Dodd v. Glen Rose Gas. Co., 194 La. 1, 193 So. 2d 349 (1940); Irby
v. Panama Ice Co., 184 La. 1082, 168 So. 306 (1936); Meyer v. Kemper Ice Co., 180
La. 10:37, 158 So. 378 (1934); Morris v. Putsman, 166 La. 14, 116 So. 577 (1928);
Monlezun v. Jahncke Dry Docks, Inc., 163 La. 400, 111 So. 886 (1927); Crump v.
Carnahan, 155 La. 648, 99 So. 493 (1924); Hill v. Batallion Wash. Art., 143 La. 533, 78
So. 844 (1918); City of Shreveport v. Leiderkranz Society, 130 La. 802, 58 So. 578
(1912); LeBlanc v. Orleans Ice Mfg. Co., 121 La. 249, 46 So. 226 (1908); Hill v. St.
Louis, Chicago & N.O.R.R., 38 La. Ann. 599 (1886); Howell v. Butchers' Union Slaugh-
terhouse Live Stk. & Land. Co., 36 La. Ann. 63 (1874); Werges v. St. Louis, Chicago
& N.O.R.R., :35 La. Ann. 641 (1883); Lewis v. Behan, Thorn & Co., 28 La. Ann. 130
(1876); Ritchey v. Lake Charles Dred. & Tow. Co., 230 So. 2d 346 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1970); Woods v. Turbeville, 168 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964); Allen v. Albright,
151 So. 2d 554 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963); Haynes v. Smith, 85 So. 2d 326 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1956); Hobson v. Walker, 41 So. 2d 789 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1949); Myer v. Minard,
21 So. 2d 72 (l,a. App. 2d Cir. 1945).
335. See note 316 supra.
:336. See Kuhl v. St. Bernard Rend. & Fert. Co., 117 La. 86, 41 So. 361 (1906);
Salter v. B.W.S. Corp., 281 So. 2d 764 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973). Early Louisiana
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ancial loss, 3u7 and prior use of the property,338 are not valid defenses
but are matters taken into account by the court in the process of
balancing the rights of the parties. Actions for injunctive relief are not
barred by liberative prescription, namely, a person does not lose his
right to the comfortable enjoyment of immovable property merely
because he did not bring action for an injunction within a certain
period of time. Courts, however, may assign considerable weight to
plaintiff's acquiescence in the erection of constructions or in the es-
tablishment of the enterprise creating the disturbance of which he
complains. 3 '
decisions indicate, however, that when an establishment is licensed by the authorities,
courts do not have authority to close it down but merely to restrain the manner in
which it is operated. See Koehl v. Schoenhousen, 47 La. Ann. 1316, 17 So. 809 (1895);
ef. Lewis v. Behan, Thorn & Co., 28 La. Ann. 130 (1876).
337. See City of New Orleans v. Degelos Bros. Grain Corp., 175 So. 2d 351 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1965). Courts, however, may take this into account in determining the
applicable corrective measures. Cf. Young v. International Paper Co., 179 La. 803, 155
So. 231 (1944), where defendant had invested millions of dollars in his paper mill and
was using the only stream available for waste disposal, the court refused injunctive
relief.
338. See Tucker v. Vicksburg & P.R.R., 125 La. 689, 51 So. 689 (1910); Jefferson
Lbr. & Con. Prod, Inc. v. Jimco, Inc., 217 So. 721 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969); Robertson
v. Shipp, 50 So. 2d 699 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1951); Ellis v. Blanchard, 45 So. 2d 100 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1950). Prior use, however, may affect the measures of damages. See Kelly
v. Ozone Tung Coop, 36 So. 2d 837 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1948); text at notes 240-42 supra.
3:39. See LeBlanc v. New Orleans Ice Mfg. Co., 121 La. 249, 46 So. 226 (1908); cf
Hilliard v. Shuff, 260 La. 384, 256 So. 2d 127, 129 (1972): "That the plaintiff was aware
that the tanks were being erected and made no complaint creates no bar to injunctive
relief under the circumstances. The record does not reflect that plaintiff had knowledge
that, because of the improper design, they would create a hazard to his property." See
also Robertson v. Shipp, 50 So. 2d 699 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1951).
